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Abstract
Hunter, Tiffany B. M.A. Applied Behavioral Science, Wright State University,
2014. American Insanity: The Demise of the Elite and a Critical/Historical Analysis of
the DSM.

The International Classification of Diseases, Sixth Edition (ICD-6; World Health
Organization, 1949) is a universal health care management tool for examining the
pathology of diseases and how to properly diagnose and treat said diseases. The birth of
the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I;
American Psychiatric Association, 1952) is the product of the ICD and the American
Medico-psychological Association and first delivered shortly after the end of the Second
World War. As per request of the American Armed Forces, which were ill-equipped to
manage the surge of mental disorders after the war, the need for a uniform classification
system to diagnose the rising number of disorders classified as numerous names and
symptoms, or inexistent in medical nomenclature, was perceived to be undoubtedly dire.
Unlike the ICD, the DSM was constructed particularly for American
classifications of mental disorders and psychosis, both organic and inorganic, which
would in the course of over 60 years expand its diagnosis to thousands of American
civilians. Since the first publication of the DSM, there have been six additional
publications that essentially define what is “normal” and “deviant” as it relates to social
behavior and function. The purpose of this research is to examine the trend of Axis II
iii

personality disorders within DSM-I through V (APA, 1952 & 2013) in regards to its
continually revised definition of the boundaries of American normalcy and the “other”1;
its impact on social behavior, economic disparity; the implications of corralling the
masses through medicalization; and an ideation of political dominance that presumes to
know what is best for the general population. By utilizing the seven editions of the DSM
to examine the literature within the manuals, it will assist in guiding through the trends of
personality disorder classifications per edition in comparison to a necessity for
controlling maladaptive behaviors. With this information in hand, it will facilitate in the
evaluation of how compartmentalized human behavior has become in relation to a limited
knowledge of the social spectrum.

1

The “other”, as it relates to the argument, represents an established prototype of

“normal” (i.e. ethnic, racial, and behavioral) by articulating what is abnormal within a
society structured by a class system. Likewise, the “other” relates to citizens of nations
abroad, both racially and ethnically, that do not adhere to American values.
iv
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I.

Chapter One

Introduction and Goals Statement
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the United States would find itself
fighting another war – an internal conflict of discipline between the approach and
practices of professional psychology. Ill-equipped to manage the surge of mental disorder
prevalence after the war, the perceived or felt need for a uniform classification system to
diagnose the rising number of disorders known under numerous names and symptoms (or
inexistence thereof) became perceivably dire. The birth of the first edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I; APA, 1952) was the
product of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-6; WHO, 1949) and the
American Medico-psychological Association, shared and guided by the American Armed
Forces. Unlike the ICD, the DSM was constructed particularly for American
classifications of mental disorders and psychosis, both organic and inorganic, which
would in the course of over 60 years expand its diagnosis to thousands of American
civilians.
By researching Axis II2 personality disorders within the American Psychological
Association’s DSM-I through DSM-V (APA, 1952 & 2013), peer reviewed articles,
commentaries, and scholarly publications, I have developed two hypotheses. First, the

2

The use of Axes in the DSM did not begin until the DSM-III (APA, 1980).
1

transition from psychoanalysis to psychiatry in the DSM-III (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980) – a discipline of psychology that was previously associated strictly
with institutionalization (Strand, 2011) – resulted in an expected increase in the average
amount of personality disorder classifications. Second, since the introduction of
psychiatry as the dominant discipline of professional psychology, the anticipated
revisions and refinement of published personality disorder classifications correlates in a
political manner which separates American behavior from the “other” as well as from one
another.
The construction of American normalcy as the standard is based on shared, preexisting, and non-critically examined cultural constructs. Using a critical theoretical
approach, I posit that the DSM is best understood as generated by a political conflict for
dominance of disciplines and rationality, as well an elitist dominance of the subservient
and the “other”. Congruent with the aforementioned, the DSM defines a standard of
“normal” by structuring what is not normal; that is, behavior that displays symptoms
outside of normative expectations for behavior. Disorder, as it relates to psychiatry, is a
slight-to-radical deviation from the manifestation of what is prescribed as acceptable
behavior. Disorder, in turn, compromises the authority of the elite by compromising its
self-worth. Therefore, the power and significance of an autonomous (elitist) authority is
only affirmed in such a position so long as the subservient population under its regime
experiences it as meaningful without force or contradiction. However, immediate
attention and uprising against Democratic unfreedom is distracted by a “satisfaction of
‘false needs’, which are themselves created by the system of mass consumption and
popular culture,” (Yar, 2012, p. 55).
2

Since the DSM is an American publication posing to examine and deconstruct
social behavior of Americans, it cannot be applicable to other nations or cultures, which
is both its benefit and Achillean weakness. Unlike biomedical practices, non-Western
cultures do not view personality disorders in the same regard as Western cultures (and
more specifically, American culture). Instead, their beliefs assume that personalities are
not deviant or maladaptive, but simply reveal an individual’s different path and
perception of life (Nikelly, 1992). I aim to explore the assumption that standardization of
normal behavior is secondary to the creation of prototypical constructions of deviant
behavior, which are instruments in methods of social control and preservation of political
power by corralling and subduing the masses.
In light of this assumption, an overarching medical jurisdiction may be to the
benefit of pharmaceutical, biomedical and technological industries in the capitalist setting
of the United States by collaborating in multiple venues which will reap profit and
control, while covertly encouraging dependence. I will supplement this assumption by
introducing the theory of medicalization in Chapter Four (Conrad, 2007), followed by
comparing the classification specificity and numerical expansion in volume size within
Axis II personality disorders from DSM-I to DSM-III, where there is a transition of
discipline from psychoanalysis to psychiatry. Furthermore, I will be reviewing the actual
number of personality disorders published per edition (DSM-I through V; Chapter Four)
and searching for shared characteristics in classifications within each publication
(Chapter Three).
To comprehend what defines truth, it is imperative to historically deconstruct
current confines of facts from a skeptical approach in order to question knowledge. To
3

mute irrationality, the popular approach in America is to remedy with institutionalization
either through clinics, imprisonment, medicalization, social sedation (discussed in
Chapter Three) or any combination of the aforementioned. With the recent release of the
newest edition of the DSM in 2013, the importance of the current research is to
rationalize that the DSM is not perfect and dependence on this particular instrument may
cause more harm than benefit to American civilians. To begin, the current chapter will
provide background insight to the historical conception and reproduction of the DSM.
Likewise, a politico-economical examination of the ever-advancing technological
lifestyle that enchants and controls the subservient American population will demonstrate
a manipulated extravagance of alienated patterns of behavior and thought. In light of the
opening chapter, I pose this question: Did the creation of the DSM exist to explain
deviant behavior (a posteriori justification), or were deviant behaviors a priori
knowledge to its construction?
Historical context of the ICD and DSM
Despite the publication year of the sixth edition of the ICD in 1949, five earlier
editions made production through the International Statistical Institute3. During a
conference in Vienna in 1891, a committee was formed where Jacques Bertillon4 was
3

World Health Organization. Date of publication is unknown.

4

(1851-1922), Chief of Statistical Services of the City of Paris, whose position detailed

the classification of causes of death. “The classification prepared by Bertillon's
committee was based on the classification of causes of death used by the City of Paris,
which, since its revision in 1885, represented a synthesis of English, German, and Swiss
classifications,” World Health Organization, retrieved from History of the development
4

named chairman. The Bertillon Classification of Causes of Death would be first
introduced to the Americas in the mid-1890s in Mexico, and later introduced to the
United States at the end of the 1890s (WHO). The responsibility of the Bertillon
Classification of Causes of Death was to publish statistics pertaining to the causes of
death as those classifications applied to the specific country every ten years, which would
prove a difficult feat to accomplish in later editions. The World Health Organization
would replace the Bertillon Classification of Causes of Death with the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD; WHO, 1949), a healthcare management tool for
examining the epistemology of diseases and how to properly diagnose and treat said
diseases.
The benefit of the ICD was its universal utility, but the United States began their
excursion for an American classification system by the end of the roaring clamor in the
1920s. In 1917, through the formulation and adoption of a “uniform statistics in hospitals
for mental disease,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. v) psychology managed to situate itself in a
more favorable position in comparison to a “large body of American medicine” (p. v) as
it pertains to standardized nomenclature. Despite the instrumentation of a classification
plan designated as “primarily a statistical classification” (p. v), the Committee on
Statistics of the American Psychiatric Association (previously known as the American
Medico-psychological Association) employed such a plan for limited classification of
mental disorders for nomenclature as well. Problematic in its own construction,
nomenclature differed from institution to institution, as each educational facility
of the ICD (http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/HistoryOfICD.pdf) on September
29, 2013. Note: date of publication is not established in the document.
5

“employed a system of its own origination,” (p. v) that fulfilled their local, immediate
needs.
By 1932, the first National Conference on Nomenclature of Disease composed a
trial edition of proposed nomenclature to distribute to a selection of hospitals. By the
following year, the first edition of the Standard Classified Nomenclature of Disease was
published and largely implemented within two years. The changes in the section
regarding Mental Disorders of the Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations
remained relatively consistent during the two revised editions in 1933 and 1942, but the
original nomenclature from 1933 remained the official diagnostic nomenclature for
medical records and standardizing. When America entered into WWII, civilian and
military psychiatry were utilizing nomenclature “developed primarily for the needs and
case loads of public mental hospitals,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. vi) which would soon
prove problematic.
Psychiatric caseloads increased as mobilization during the Second World War
ensued and the need for accurate accounts of morbidity required an appropriate diagnosis
by a psychiatrist, but it was not practiced among civilians. The classification and
diagnoses of active duty military personnel became very important, but lacked a standard
for nomenclature and criteria, which is imperative. Military psychiatrists, induction
station psychiatrists, and Veterans Administration psychiatrists utilized a separate system
of nomenclature from one another, resulting in different diagnoses for one individual per
system. As stated in the foreword of the first edition of the DSM (APA, 1952), “Only
about 10% of the total cases seen fell into any of the categories ordinarily seen in public
mental hospitals,” (p. vi) thereby restricting nomenclature to an expanding caseload.
6

Consequentially, psychosomatic disorders were classified by a gastroenterologist or
cardiologist and incorporated into wartime nomenclature. For example, men who were
reacting to considerable amounts of immediate stress were categorized as
“psychoneurotic”, and minor personality disturbances were classified as “psychopathic
personality” (DSM-I; APA, 1952).
Nevertheless, many of these soldiers who were once labeled as “psychoneurotic”
or “psychopathic” did not match the contingencies of either label in subsequent studies.
Therefore, during this time of heavy attention to psychiatric evaluation regarding reactive
stress to combat experienced by soldiers in the war, terms were invented by medical
professionals to satisfy classification standards. Thus, the previous system of
nomenclature previously utilized became archaic and futile. Continuing with this trend in
makeshift adjustments, by 1944, the Navy altered some of the nomenclature from the
Mental Disorders of the Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations to fit the
disturbances mentioned above, while striving to stay within the limitations of the
Standard. By 1945, the Army made further revisions with disregard for the Standard,
“attempting to express present day concepts of mental disturbance,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952,
p. vii) a trend which was eventually incorporated by all of the branches of the American
Armed Forces.
During the following year, the Veterans Administration adopted a similar style of
nomenclature. By 1948, a similar rubric of classified mental disorders was revised and
categorized in the International Statistical Classification. Likewise, the standards of
nomenclature set in 1942 were obliterated to a pile of confusion and at least three
separate standards of nomenclature were utilized, including the Standard Classified
7

Nomenclature of Disease, Armed Forces, and Veterans Administration – none of which
coincided with the International Statistical Classification. As highlighted in the foreword
of the first edition of the DSM (APA, 1952), “One agency found itself in the
uncomfortable position of using one nomenclature for clinical use, a different one for
disability rating, and the International for statistical work,” (p. vii). Aside from the
modifications previously implemented in teaching intuitions, psychiatrists returning from
military duty in the Armed Forces introduced an assortment of nomenclature
modifications, and then incorporated them into many clinics and hospitals (DSM-I; APA,
1952).
The successes and shortcomings of the various systems of nomenclature provided
by the Army and Veterans Administration were used as examples by the National
Committee of Mental Hygiene for revision considerations of the current Standard. Along
with the material utilized from the aforementioned agencies, psychiatric teaching quarters
were probed for ideas regarding diseases and nomenclature – including organic brain
disorders. The efforts that were made to acquire any possible information from experts in
American psychiatry, and literature concerning such, were incorporated into
brainstorming for the newest revision. Statistical aspects, something not previously
utilized, facilitated the conception of a trial revision of official psychiatric nomenclature
that was distributed to 10% of the members in the American Psychiatric Association by
April 19505. This included members’ addresses selected from geographical listings, 10%
5

American Psychiatric Association (1952). Note: The Foreword explains that the

selection of members was attributed to the position that was held to provide complete
coverage to each aspect of psychiatry in order to receive fair sampling from the included
8

from each state and Canada, whom would receive a trial revised copy and an additional
nine-page questionnaire for the purposes of opinions and suggestions (APA, 1952).
Given that each member received a 3-month deadline to review the revision and
complete the questionnaire, it is not surprising that out of the 520 copies distributed only
241 were returned prior to July, 1950. From the returned questionnaires, 224 (93%)
expressed approval, 11 (5%) expressed disapproval, and 6 (2%) of respondents expressed
neutrality towards the proposed revision (DSM-I; APA, 1952). Albeit that more than half
of the reviewers left specific suggestions and recommendations in their comments, the
lowest rating of approval for any section did not sink below 72% (DSM-I; APA, 1952). A
short period of time for completion of the questionnaire may skew the perception of the
revised edition in a favorable light. The members of the American Psychiatric
Association who did not receive follow-up notifications concerning their absent
questionnaires may have directly contributed to the biased statistics for approval of the
first trial edition.
A large proportion of reviewers claimed to address the revision in discussions
with colleagues and meetings with staff members of mental hospitals, clinics, and other
administrative groups. The fraction of returned questionnaires began another round of
revisions in 1950, using the same method as before to obtain authorization by Council to
groups: American Neurological Association, American Psychoanalytic Association,
Academy of Neurology, American Psychopathological Association, to name a few.
“Members of the staffs of State Departments of Mental Health were included in order to
obtain an expression of opinion from such departments concerning the statistical and
clinical impact of the proposed revision,” (p. ix).
9

the Standard Nomenclature for the edition written in 1951 (APA, 1952) with the goal of
publication by the American Psychiatric Association. In the fashion of an epic heroic tale,
the foreword of the first edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1952)
details how involved the federal government has been in regards to the collection of
etiology of mental disorders. As it details, “Delegated from year to year on a fiscal basis
to the Bureau of the Census, morbidity statistics in this most important area perhaps
would never have been collected had it not been for the untiring efforts of former
Committees on Statistics of the American Psychiatric Association and the National
Committee on Mental Hygiene,” (DSM-I; American Psychiatric Association, 1952, p. x).
The birth of the first edition of the DSM was the product of collaborative effort
between the ICD, National Committee of Mental Hygiene, and American Medicopsychological Association, which was delivered shortly after the Second World War. The
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics, a section of the American Psychiatric
Association, collaborated with the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (renamed the
National Association for Mental Health) for the publication of the DSM. After receiving
approval by the Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics and agreement with the
National Association for Mental Health, the Mental Hospital Service of the APA received
authority for publishing future publications of the DSM. However, the first publication of
the DSM represents the nomenclature of the section concerning Diseases of the
Psychobiologic Unit within the Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations,
Fourth Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1952).
In the following chapter, an application of Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) concepts of
one-dimensionality, falsified rationality and dialectical thought will assist in analyzing
10

the characteristics of capitalism, the elitist class’ construction of standardized behavior,
and its effect on the general population. Specifically, the pattern of change within each
publication of the DSM’s personality disorders is adaptive as it relates to the cultural
beliefs of what is deviant behavior. Moreover, the introduction of the Five-Factor Model
(FFM)6, described by McCrae and Costa (1999) as “a dimensional model that consists of
five broad domains […] that can be further differentiated into more specific facets” (see
Widiger, 2005, p. 495) of human behavior will assist in the deconstruction of a
contradictory continuum.

6

Costa & McCrae (1992). NEO Personality Inventory – Revised (Neo-PI-R)
11

Chapter Two

“The major change, of course, was the substitution of the newly accepted
terminology for the old. Many of the new terms were broader in scope
than the old to conform to the basic thinking among psychiatrists that
some disorders or reactions formerly considered as separate clinical
entities are really expressions of a single disease,” (DSM-I; American
Psychiatric Association, 1952, p. 103).

Herbert Marcuse’s one-dimensional theoretical approach in One-Dimensional
Man (1964) strongly coincides with Veblen’s critique of the leisure class, where the
desires and needs of the laborer are represented as identical in necessity. The presented
desires are conspicuous consumptions of the dominant class and their specific politicoeconomic interests to impose as rational and purposeful. The allure of the desires, known
as “false needs” (Marcuse, 1964), maintain a status quo manifesting itself as materialistic
values in an object-fueled society. The concept of “false needs” represents a
superimposed need or desire upon the individual by particular social interests; in turn,
this masks an individual’s true or basic needs (those of which are necessary to survive)
for distraction of an assumed internal drive to belong to a group or society as a whole. As
a result,

12

individuals in a technologically-advanced, capitalist society quantify their worth and satisfaction
by the quantity and quality of their possessions. Therefore, by assuming that an individual’s
needs and desires are one in the same, an individual’s needs are based on the needs of dominant
conception (Kertzer, 1979), or what is socially accepted, yet not articulated, as common sense.
More specifically, they are the needs which render servitude and rationalism via control of
societal institutions and their interests. As Marcuse (1964) argues,
“The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective
suffocation of those needs which demand liberation – liberation also from that
which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable – while it sustains and absolves
the destructive power and repressive function of the affluent society,” (p. 7).

Imagine a healthy cell of the human body; it is serving its function of sustaining the
body’s normal functions, laboring through debris and toxins in order to maintain the ultimate
goal of sustaining the body. As this particular cell begins to enlarge, its organelles separate and
replicate its purpose and functionality in a matter of seconds. Moments later, the cell cleaves and
its innards are appropriating to their assigned positions until one cell separates itself from the
other. Ultimately, one cell will die but its premise for existence prevails in the essence of its
offspring, which may encounter different scenarios and adjust accordingly. Similarly, the same
argument for the process of mitosis can serve macroscopically to the behavior of the individual
and their role within society. The presence of each individual in a capitalist society is apparently
classless and identical in desires and needs, through which their raison d'être is to serve the
ultimate function of sustaining the existence of society and assimilate to change.

13

“The government of advanced and advancing industrial societies can maintain and
secure itself only when it succeeds in mobilizing, organizing, and exploiting the
technical, scientific, and mechanical productivity available to industrial
civilizations. And this productivity mobilizes society as a whole, above and
beyond any particular individual or group interests,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 3).

Through absolving the perception of class differences and emphasizing a perceived
“sameness” of individuals in technologically-advanced and advancing industrial societies,
assimilation to one common denominator has become the prioritized goal. This idea of faux
“equalization of class distinctions” (p. 8) serves a competitive function in which the needs and
satisfactions of the underlying population are shared via preservation of the Establishment
(Marcuse, 1964), or dominating class. In turn, this perceptual sameness transposes the self by
externalizing the Ego and internalizing a generic identity, which is reinforced by observation and
immediate, automatic identification with the object world. However, cultural classifications
prove to be purposeful because it defines a certain reality which affects the group’s thoughts and
behaviors. Therefore, the entirety of subservient human behavior and alienation is mimetically
reinforced through obligation; the individual’s desires and identity appear to be one within the
individual and between their (proximal and metaphorical) neighbors.
As exclusive goods become available to more social classes, their existence becomes a
means for a better quality of life. One-dimensional thought thrives in the industrially advanced,
capitalist mindset because it “… is systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their
purveyors of mass information,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 14). As the quality of life appears to
improve by the aggregation of exclusive goods, the behavior of materialistic individuals reduces
14

to “ideas, aspirations, and objectives [that]… are redefined by the rationality of the given system
and of its quantitative extension,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 12, brackets added). Evidentiary influence
in the forms of propaganda, weaponry, art, music, television, films, and advertising provided by
the media are powerful tools which reinforce the efficacy of control over the individual; a
demonstration of power which continuously reproduces higher expectations for human behavior
and status quo by supplying choices through imposition.
The concept of American liberty is counterintuitive by which its practices make a
powerful instrument in domination (Marcuse, 1964) and sustaining alienation. By
acknowledging that American democracy provides liberties, it also emphasizes negations
regarding individual unfreedom, or restrictions to human freedom. Social controls make
necessities out of deceptive liberties through what has been optioned to the individual. More
specifically, freedoms of competition, speech, and choice represent degrees of human freedom;
that is, what choices are given to individuals (what can be chosen) and what is chosen from these
options by the individual (Marcuse, 1964).
Ironically, Marxian theories of the laboring class are applicable to the practice of
capitalism; however, Americans desire to be drastically separate from communism because
American Exceptionalism represents qualitative differentiation from communism. During the
Cold War, the political war between two superpowers targeted each other as the great enemy; so
to admit that the ends of human and instrument productivity to both political means are material
goods would be perceived as illogical and dogmatically self-destructive. Furthermore, the
cohesion of a nation’s citizens are astronomically boosted when, “It is a cohesion on materialistic
grounds; mobilization against the enemy works as a mighty stimulus of production and
employment, thus sustaining the high standard of living,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 21). Individuals are
15

viewed as instruments with limitless depths of productivity with rigid standards of possibility;
compliance inhibits their potential to perceive alternative modes of true satisfaction, instead
encouraging materialism and competition. Thus, the standard of living correlates with the
amount of human productivity, separatism from the “other” and social alienation from each
other.
With continuous refinement and increased production speed, technology has incorporated
its utility within the private sphere of the individual, whom slowly sacrifices privacy until it is
virtually nonexistent. For this practice to survive and cohesion as a medium of control prevail, a
change in the technical structure itself (Marcuse, 1964) must universally engulf privacy within
publicity. This change would prompt that the subservient class is conditionally alienated from
individuality and internalize productivity as a matter of survival and quantitative change.
Productivity as a means of survival is presupposed as logical to survival with an expanding
population, a majority of which comprise the laboring class, and a rapidly disappearing middle
class. The acquisition of objects and materials is gluttonous by which an individual will never
find total satisfaction in their quantity, and thus never reach actualization of their self-worth.
Their self-worth in turn is an end to their laborious means, which encourage objects as
necessities to survival in lieu of existing as leisurely goods.
A promising lifestyle of comfort for those unable to imagine alternatives and a “capacity
to contain and manipulate subversive imagination and effort,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 23) maintains
the lubrication of mechanical productivity. However, is the price of overexertion of the laboring
class worth the ends of a never-ending desire for objects? Michel Foucault’s dissection of the
origins, adjustment, and allocation of penalizing the body in Discipline and Punish (1975)
emphasizes the process of appropriating penalty upon the deviant and insane. The dominant class
16

reinforces their power of cohesion by corralling bodies to fulfill expectations of their behavior
and punishing outliers either physically, psychologically, economically, or any combination of
the three methods. Punishment has likewise transitioned from translating a committed crime with
the severity of physical pain, to utilizing the body as a means of reform, where the individual is
the embodiment of punishment. Therefore, the consequences of nonconformity yield
participation in an artistic refinement of punishment, which has changed alongside the technical
structure of an industrially advanced society.

“The names of things are not only ‘indicative of their manner of functioning,’ but
their actual manner of functioning also defines and ‘closes’ the meaning of the
thing, excluding other manners of functioning,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 87).

Rationality is constructed to define what a concept is as well as what it is not, implying
that what is rational is also factual and cannot be repudiated. Marcuse’s concept of rationality is
jointly associated with advancements in technology, which serves as a cohesion of power and
social control for the general population where individuals and nature are viewed strictly as
objects, or means to an end (overproductivity and goods). Reality, as it pertains to industriallyadvanced nations, is implicitly interwoven with technology in a way that individuals may
perceive objects, experiences, and even themselves solely in present-tense. Under such
circumstances of existing in an object-world, both individual and machine are viewed as
malleable, alienated, and willing instruments. Individuals, like machines, are given
predetermined possibilities (a technical raison d'être) which inhibit their abilities to perform in
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an alternative fashion and are thusly equivalent to their worth among each other and against
technological commodity.
Linguistics in a technologically-advanced society is functional in that its structure may
absolve abstract thinking and repel conflicting interpretations in order to dismiss historical
reference and eliminate challenge. Two-dimensional thought incorporates actuality with
appearance; an opposition of dimensions where abstract, critical thinking (Marcuse, 1964, p. 97)
exists in reality and contradiction. Dialectical language, Marcuse (1964) argues, contains
elements of both reality and history; in its absence, a suppression of history is politically
motivated to distort language and its content. By successfully accomplishing a stunted
vocabulary of context and discourse, the purpose of anti-dialectical language (p. 97) serves to
direct and control the general population to live and exist in the present (Marcuse, 1964).
Furthermore, an abridgment of opposing concepts that would previously signal contradiction,
now elicits truth in its falsification. The logical purposes for erasing the past eliminate future
self-destruction: “Remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous insights, and the
established society,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 98) may become disenchanted from an associative
power that promises a better (materialistic) way of life.
As anti-dialectical language relates to the theme of the seven editions of the DSM and the
opening quote (p. 15) within the first edition of the DSM (DSM-I; APA, 1952), a special focus of
consideration should consider the nomenclature utilized in describing human personality traits
and their alleged disorders. An individual’s personality as a whole is socialized and internalized;
the wide range of observed personality traits and the manner from which they are formed are
based upon societal interactions and the dominating class’ expectations of what is considered
acceptable behavior. Personality traits exist within every individual; it is what shapes the
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perception of experiences, the ability to relate and contemplate the existence of the environment
and the self. The expectations from the dominant class, as it pertains to the laboring class’
interactions with one another, insist that criteria accepted as fact sustains the subservient class as
“rational to an unprecedented degree,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 84). In developing a system of
linguistic control that confines an individual’s ability to develop abstract interpretations, antidialectical language limits their very ability to communicate and develop an abstract
imagination, or higher thought. Consequentially, the laboring class’ ability to oppose and
consider alternative measures remains incredibly limited, if nonexistent.
The “Big Five” and its Contradictory Continuum
Human behavior has undergone decades of research and experimentation, with the
primary goal to understand the expression of observable actions, with contributions made by
possible by federal funding. In 1961, two U.S. Air Force researchers by the names of Tupes and
Christal (1961/1992) began to examine common language (i.e. American English) in order to
produce a comprehensive set of personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 2005). Utilizing a set of 16
proposed personality factors (Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire; Cattell, 1946) (e.g.
warmth, reasoning, dominance, and liveliness) first described by Cattell in 1946 (see McCrae &
Costa, 2005), Tupes and Christal (1961/1992) condensed a model of five observable factors
taken from several samples. In turn, those findings were replicated by Norman (1963) and
described as “an adequate taxonomy of personality traits,” (McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 35).
However, research in personality factors would not be revived until Goldberg (1981; see McCrae
& Costa, 2005) analyzed the origin of personality trait synonyms in order to apply them to his
own research, thereby replicating the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of human disposition (McCrae
& Costa, 2005).
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McCrae and Costa (2005) describe traits and a method for observation as, "[…]
generalized dispositions, so [we know] we must look for evidence of consistent patterns of
behavior or reactions across a range of situations," (p. 37, brackets added). The patterns of
behaviors or reactions that produced consistent results ultimately comprised the elements of the
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness (to experience) Personality Inventory (NEO-PI;
McCrae & Costa, 1985) and its revised version, which contains Agreeableness and
Conscientiousness (NEO-PI-R; McCrae & Costa, 1992). The NEO-PI-R (McCrae & Costa,
1992) is a survey consisting of 240 items adapted for self-administration or observational
evaluation, and the purpose of this inventory is to categorize behavior by attributing a numerical
value (between 1-5) to associate with a characteristic (McCrae & Costa, 2005). Furthermore,
contained within each domain is a subset of six scales, or facets, that specifically measure the
overall concept of its given domain.
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The "Big Five" – Five-Factor Model (FFM) of Personality
Domain

Facets

Constituents

Wide range of interests,
Introspective, Unusual thought
processes, Values intellectual
Openness (to experience)
matters, Judges in
Imaginative Wide interests
unconventional terms,
Aesthetically reactive.
Dependable/responsible,
Efficient
Reliable
Productive,
Able to delay
Organized
Responsible
Conscientiousness
gratification,
Not
self-indulgent,
Behaves
Planful
Thorough
ethically, Has high aspiration level.
Talkative, Skilled in play/humor,
Active
Enthusiastic
Rapid personal tempo,
Assertive
Outgoing
Extraversion
Gregarious, Facially/gesturally
Energetic
Talkative
expressive.
Not critical/skeptical, Behaves in
Appreciative Kind
giving way, Arouses liking,
Forgiving
Sympathetic
Agreeableness
Warm/compassionate,
Sympathetic/considerate, Basically
Generous
Trusting
trustful.
Thin-skinned, Brittle ego defenses,
Anxious
Touchy
Self-defeating, Basically
Self-pitying
Unstable
Neuroticism
anxious, Concerned with
Tense
Worrying
adequacy, Fluctuating moods.
Table 2.1, The Five-Factor Model (FFM) of human personality, adapted from McCrae & John
Artistic
Curious

Insightful
Original

(1992, p. 178-179).
As shown above in Table 1.1, the FFM consists of Openness to experience,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. The above table also lists the
six facets associated with each domain and its constituents, or elements that conceptualize and
differentiate one factor from the others. Further elaboration of each domain’s contradictory
continuum and factors will be achieved in the following table (Table 2.2), but for now, each
domain will be explained as it is described by McCrae and Costa (2005). Openness to experience
refers to a “receptiveness to new ideas, approaches, and experiences,” (McCrae & Costa, 2005,
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p. 46). Neuroticism refers to an individual’s proneness “to experience unpleasant and disturbing
emotions” and for their actions to correspond to their emotions (McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 46).
Extraversion represents “differences in preference for social interaction and lively activity”
(McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 46). Agreeableness represents a “selfless concern for others and in
trusting and generous sentiments” (McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 46). Lastly, Conscientiousness
represents a “dimension of individual differences in organization and achievement,” (McCrae &
Costa, 2005, p. 46).
Named categories elicit emotions and motives; they can elicit a call to action for service
to the country, or to endure exhaustive hours of labor in order to maintain the functioning of the
system during a time of economic dependence. Marcuse (1964) argues, “It is the word that
orders and organizes, that induces people to do, to buy, and to accept,” (p. 86). Inasmuch the
very limited nouns and concepts restricts the subservient population’s ability to formulate
meaning (“habits of thought”; Marcuse, 1964, p. 85), it also stunts their ability to communicate
and furthermore, interact. The functionality of words and concepts in the current capitalist,
industrially-advanced society are the product of the system itself; that is, their concepts are
operationalized through science and technology (Marcuse, 1964) to accommodate the
elimination of privacy and autonomous dependence. Thus, by rigidly structuring concepts to fit
observed behaviors, the subservient population’s interactions, beliefs, and attitudes can be
standardized; traits that do not adhere to standardized preconceptions of behavior are therefore
seen as disordered in its formation and execution.
Marcuse’s (1964) analysis of dialectical thought and behavior utilizes the perspective of
what is socially normal, as well as its cohesion with contradictions along a lexical continuum.
More specifically, by adjoining opposing nouns and adjectives to describe behavior and
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observable concepts to the current American English language resembles Orwellian (1949)
Newspeak. When it is possible to classify behaviors by justifying what it is not (i.e., not healthy,
not desirable), the cohesion of control to unify opposites exhibits them as one in the same, which
validates its truth and eliminates cognitive ambiguity. As Marcuse (1964) remarks, “The syntax
of abridgement proclaims the reconciliation of opposites by welding them together in a firm and
familiar structure,” (p. 89). Therefore, by placing opposing concepts along the same continuum,
the structure of current “Newspeak” conditions the human mind to perceive and function along
such a rationale of behavior.
The Five-Factor Model -- Human Personality Continuum
Domain

Continuum
Down-to-earth -- Imaginative
Prefer routine -- Prefer variety
Openness (to experience)
Uncreative -- Creative
Uncurious -- Curious
Conventional -- Original
Conservative -- Liberal
Negligent -- Conscientious
Aimless -- Ambitious
Lazy -- Hardworking
Quitting -- Persevering
Conscientiousness
Late -- Punctual
Disorganized -- Well-organized
Reserved -- Affectionate
Passive -- Active
Loner -- Joiner
Sober -- Fun-loving
Extraversion
Quiet -- Talkative
Unfeeling -- Passionate
Ruthless -- Softhearted
Antagonistic -- Acquiescent
Suspicious -- Trusting
Critical -- Lenient
Agreeableness
Stingy -- Generous
Irritable -- Good-natured
Calm -- Worrying
Comfortable -- Self-conscious
Even-tempered -- Temperamental
Unemotional -- Emotional
Neuroticism
Self-satisfied -- self-pitying
Hardy -- Vulnerable
Table 2.2, The Five Factor Model (Human Personality Continuum), adapted from McCrae &
Costa (2005, p. 4; 1986).
As shown above in Table 1.2, the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of human behavior
exemplifies the current argument that the human personality spectrum is located along a
continuum of contradictions. As it relates to Orwellian conception of Newspeak, combining
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nouns and adjectives that are otherwise oppositional unifies a concept’s meaningfulness within
the individual mind and cuts off circulation to creativity. Albeit their attributes are supposed to
range in strength of presence, each factor’s continuum are ultimately dichotomous in nature and
represent a scale of characteristics that are weighed as either “desirable” or “not desirable”,
“healthy” or “not healthy”. Through repetition of such conditioned behaviors, the individual
creates a fixed image of a prototypical being, a status quo of identification adjoined with false
familiarity.
The subservient class is expected to associate and abide by its given contradictions, as
they are delivered as facts and rationality. By fusing contradictions along a continuum, repetition
creates a sense of familiarity which lacks true understanding or application of its meaning.
Furthermore, an association with social ideals structures a fixated representation which
assimilates to context, and perpetuates a sense of timelessness and static presence all at once. As
it relates to behavior and personality, a trait along a continuum encourages prototypical
compliance, continues the social need for common identification, and validates the cohesion of
power within adjoining contradictions. When a behavior fails to coincide with normalcy, the
function, physical features, and habits of the individual or a group of individuals, “…leaves no
space for distinction, development, differentiation of meaning; it moves and lives only as a
whole,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 93). Therefore, a collection of negative attributes creates a monstrous
entity of fear and an overemphasized negation from normalcy. Thus, a scaffold is erected; what
is seen as “not desirable” and “not healthy” is the ultimate fear, and results in an alienation from
the master as well as the subservient.
According to Widiger (2003), “All of the fundamental symptomatology of the personality
disorders can be understood as maladaptive variants of personality traits evident within the
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normal population,” (p. 132). In the first and second editions of the DSM (APA, 1952 & 1968),
personality disorders are categorized in the same axis as clinical disorders. However, personality
disorders first appear in the third edition of the DSM (DSM-III, APA, 1980) within a separate
axis 7 in large response to “accumulating evidence that the quality and quantity of preexisting
personality disturbance may influence the predisposition, manifestation, course, and response to
treatment of various Axis I conditions,” (Frances, 1980; see Widiger, 2003, p. 131). In more
recent editions of the DSM (APA; DSM-IV, 1994; DSM-IV-TR, 2000; & DSM-V, 2013) mental
retardation (also called intellectual disabilities) is in the same axis as personality disorders,
which one may infer shares relatedness to maladaptive personalities. Assumedly, dysfunctions in
behavior and disabilities of intellect may be attributed to (or contribute to) the prevalence of
clinical disorders such as (but not limited to) depression, anxiety, delirium, and obsessivecompulsive disorder (OCD).
Deviations from normal personality that may disrupt the structured, rational behavior of
the general population are viewed as dysfunctional, and its constituents are contextually-based
and readjusted as shared beliefs qualitatively shift. As elaborated by the second edition of the
DSM, personality disorders are biologically characterized as “deeply ingrained maladaptive
patterns of behavior that are perceptibly different in quality from psychotic and neurotic
symptoms,” (DSM-II; APA, 1968). “It is only when personality traits are inflexible and
maladaptive and cause either significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or
subjective distress that they constitute Personality Disorders,” (DSM-III; APA, 1980). For an
example of fluctuation on views of maladaptive traits, personality disorders classified sexual
7

Personality disorders (Axis II) belong to a separate category from clinical disorders (Axis I) as

of the publication of the DSM-III (1980).
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deviation, alcoholism, and drug dependence were viewed as dysfunctional behaviors in the
DSM-I (Widiger, 2003)8.
Personality traits are usually not viewed as problematic by the individual, whose
characteristics may be assumed to be a product of interaction and refinement of the Ego. The
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) explains a personality trait as “… enduring patterns of perceiving,
relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of
social and personal contexts,” (p. 686). Widiger (2003) argues, “Personality traits are integral to
each person’s sense of self, as they include what people value, how they view themselves, and
how they act most every day throughout much of their lives,” (p. 131). The DSM-IV (APA,
1994) and DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) extend the conceptualization of personality disorders to one
that implies a societal recognition of maladaptive behavior, not just an individual-based
conception. Therefore, what the individual may not see as problematic or deviant can radically
be contrasted to societal observation. Between the six-year gap in publication between the DSMIV and DSM-IV-TR, there are no visible adjustments made to what constitutes as a disorder of
personality:
“A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and inflexible,
has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or
impairment,” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 26).

8

Sexual and gender identity disorders (known as sexual deviation in DSM-I) are currently

associated with Axis I disorders. Alcoholism and drug dependence are currently part of the
section regarding substance-related disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994)
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Axis II: Personality Disorders in the DSM-IV-TR (2000).
·
·
·

Paranoid Personality Disorder
Schizoid Personality Disorder
Schizotypal Personality Disorder

·
·
·
·

Antisocial Personality Disorder
Borderline Personality Disorder
Histrionic Personality Disorder
Narcissistic Personality Disorder

·
·
·

Avoidant Personality Disorder
Dependent Personality Disorder
Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder

·

Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified

Cluster A

Cluster B

Cluster C

Table 2.3, Axis II personality disorders and clusters, as listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition revised (APA, 2000).
Table 2.3 highlights the current personality disorders classified in the DSM-IV-TR
(2000)9 and their designated clusters. According to their clusters, Clusters A, B, and C describe
an observable characteristic in their classification, “based on descriptive similarities” (DSM-IV;
APA, 1994, p. 629). Cluster A, which includes paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal personality
disorders, is often manifested as odd or eccentric behavior in individuals. Cluster B, which
includes antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality disorders, manifests itself
as individuals often appearing “dramatic, emotional, or erratic,” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 630).

9

The current personality disorders listed in Axis II from the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) are

identical to the publication of classifications in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), so either publication
may be used.
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Cluster C, which includes avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders,
is often characterized as anxious or fearful behavior in individuals (DSM-IV; APA, 1994).
Ironically, below the description of what each cluster entails, the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) states,
“It should be noted that this clustering system, although useful in some research and educational
situations, has serious limitations and has not been consistently validated,” (p. 630).
Furthermore, co-morbidity of illnesses from different clusters may make it impossible (and
improbable) to ascribe one personality disorder from one specific cluster to one specific
individual.
In conclusion of the chapter, Marcuse (1964) has laid the groundwork for explaining the
compliance of normal behavior subliminally reinforced to the subservient population. A sense of
satisfaction by acquiring materials insists that the concept of “false needs” replaces alternative
routes of thinking, as well as eliminates time, both retrospective and projective, as well as
conceptual ambiguity. By assuming that an individual’s needs and desires are one in the same, an
individual’s needs render servitude and rationalism via control of societal institutions and their
interests. By presuming that the subservient class shares a virtual sameness compared to each
other, an assumption of class distinctions as nonexistent serves as a competitive function of
preserving the federal government, or dominant class. On the other hand, the cultural
classifications presented in the DSM act as a mode of social control for the subservient class by
articulating maladaptive or incorrect modes of otherwise obligatory behavior and thought based
on class and societal position. Moreover, the entirety of subservient human personality and
behavior is said to be conceptualized within five domains: Openness to experience,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.
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Given the historical background covered in Chapter One and the groundwork covered in
Chapter Two regarding critically analyzing American society, the cornerstone for social
alienation and insanity has been set. Albeit Marcuse’s critical examination of technologically
advanced and advancing societies offers a purpose for standardizing normal behavior, it still does
not satisfy the social pariah of the alienated, subservient population – the abnormal. In the
following chapter, Michel Foucault’s perspective of the abnormal in Madness and Civilization: A
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1964) and The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of
Medical Perception (1963) will facilitate in further elaborating on the five domains of human
personality traits, their contradicting disorders, as well as what insanity entails.
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Chapter Three
“Madness deals not so much with truth and the world, as with man and
whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive,” (Michel Foucault,
Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason,
1964, p. 27).
To explain the concepts of Western concern, one should begin the journey by
excavating the premises of the past and apply its essential contingencies to current
subjectivity. As discussed in the previous chapter, Marcuse depicts the separation of
classes within a “classless society” to symbolize an adhesive division of labor and its
stupefying, futile effect on fulfilling desires against the structure of false needs. Moreover,
by promoting an ideology of generic needs and an apparent equalization of class
distinctions, it technically generates more problems in lieu of pacifying most concerns.
Immediate attention should be drawn to the first contradiction of error – how is it possible
to exist in a society that is both divided by social worth and equilibrated in their
distinctions? An obvious answer would be through heavy sedation, but not through routes
of pharmaceutical sedation (which takes place at higher levels of a heuristic hierarchy)
inasmuch as primarily social sedation, competition, and alienation.
In the current chapter, the discussion opens by providing a brief introduction to a
new critique of social control in order to demonstrate the framework of the themes
previously explained in the last chapter. The purpose of the following figure (Figure
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3.1) is to visually demonstrate the malleability of human motivation based upon the
manipulation by the dominant class and how its priorities are structured along five
rungs, where each level cannot be triumphed without conquering the ones below it.
After briefly discussing the lower three “levels” of achieving social control – social
sedation, assimilation, desire and competition – it will be possible to illustrate in further
detail the social construction and function of the mentally insane, the examining gaze,
and their placement within society.
Following the discussion of the social function that encompasses alienation and
ostracism of the mentally ill, the chapter will conclude by reviewing the contextual
revision of abnormal behavior as it pertains to Axis II personality disorders within
DSM-I (APA, 1952) through DSM-V (2013). Instead of elaborating first about the
revisions present per edition of the DSM, it is with strongest confidence that providing
an alternative, critical perspective will make it possible to defend the position of the
current research as well as its integrity. By discussing the abnormal as it is documented
in an American diagnostic tool towards the conclusion of this chapter, the goal is to
first, demonstrate that American Exceptionalism is flawed; and secondly, absolute faith
in a militaristic tool for diagnosing abnormalities is the origin for conditioning
acceptable, normal American behavior.
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Hunter’s Hierarchy of Social Adhesion (2014)

Figure 3.1, Hunter’s hierarchy of social adhesion (2014).
To understand the DSM in real-life circumstances as it relates to social sedation,
it must be brought to explanation with a heuristic device. As displayed above in Figure
3.1, a critical analysis of the hierarchy of social adhesion (Hunter, 2014) demonstrates a
pyramidal construction of the elitist class’ solution to the irrational contradiction within
social worth and the equalization of social distinctions. Social sedation is the
groundwork and the adhesive of a developing society; more specifically, to equalize
social distinctions, said distinctions have to first be created. To clarify, the above device
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describes a purely empirical model of lower level social adhesion, an analytical contrast
between the natural and functional, which systematically conforms to maintain seamless
contextual synchronicity. Likewise, Figure 3.1 aims to materialize the rationale of the
subservient class’ reality (i.e., obligatory thoughts and behaviors) by demonstrating how
it is shaped at each rung as well as its impact on the following rungs. As a precursor first
and foremost, the above diagram is merely an intermediate set of actions which occur
between the time of social construction, the division of social worth, and the
equalization of social distinctions. Moreover, the above device is utilized to critically
analyze a possible conception of uniform behavior and its functional outliers.
Social Sedation, Assimilation, Desire and Competition. Before the Greeks of
Classical history would perceive one another as nationally Greek, Greece would take
the threat of Darius I and Xerxes’ tyrannical Persian invasion to bind Athens, Sparta,
Megara, Corinth, and Aragon into a single force and notion. All of the conflict
occurring between city-states appeared quite trivial against the threat of bondage by a
larger, foreign enemy; ergo, their differences no longer appeared as flaws based on
location (e.g., Spartan brute force, Athenian navy). However, there were a contradictive
set of standards by ancient Greeks, who acquired many slaves as a result of war.
However, under the presumption of a free democracy, the Greeks are fundamentally
above the notion of bondage. However, against the massive Persian Empire, an
Achillean rage cried out “I am Greek!” in a seismic clamor and victory was achieved in
the early 500 B.C. era. As a product of preservation, the birth of nationalism entered the
stage of social sedation and Greeks were unified.
In Western society, specifically American society, it is a civilization blended
33

with hundreds of ethnicities, as its infamous nickname “The Great Melting Pot” depicts.
For the sake of self-preservation however, a notion of Americanism first survives within
us all, resisting tyrannical bondage. America was founded on the basis of escaping
religious persecution, but there is a contradiction within that venture to escape
persecution: a chance to create political and religious dominance. A chance of freedom
to dominate is the fresh canvas to a painter’s brush; anything is possible to illustrate,
given the proper tools are present. Cultural values encourage American citizens to
embrace the meaning of being separate from other nations. Moreover, variables that
adhere to customs and tradition (such as social roles, gender scripts, and racial
stereotypes) are forever present yet contextually different to meet the demands of a
developing landscape moving temporally forward.
In order for the seed to sprout roots, the ground it impregnates must be able to
sustain the seed during this fragile period of germination. The assimilation of a group
requires that its members do not conflict and splinter, which means that eccentric
individuality and objectivity have to be suffocated before it flickers. Marcuse’s (1964)
postulation of one-dimensionality clearly regards the elimination of the abstract as a
compromise of living in comfort and confidence in exchange for alternative,
independent thinking (p. 23). Therefore, by limiting creativity within the bounds of
utility and rationality as a whole under the guise of security, the dominant class is
exercising power with minimal force.
Much of what can be said for desire and competition is discussed in the previous
chapter but in summation, it is the driving force behind maintaining lubrication within
the malleability of the laboring class. With distractions provided by vanity (social
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desirability) and false needs, hours of stupefying labor scaffolds the silhouetted image
of comfort and the fear of being without. In technologically-advanced countries, one’s
worth is displayed by tangible items, titles, education, and physical appearance. Fear of
the unknown is quite powerful and expends minimal energy; fear maintains that labor
will persist in order to avoid decay of self-esteem and therefore, labor sustains pleasure.
Furthermore, fear of the unknown, or the “other”, and its questionable implications of
inquiry mobilize the dynamic alterations of desire and competition to persist.
As pouring sand into a basket filled with holes is quite ludicrous in retrospect,
the ideation of an American Exceptionalism is constantly under objectification for
exactly this reason. Nietzsche’s nihilistic denunciation of a present and living God, civil
rights, women’s liberation, Sartre’s illusion of an existential hell10, and the everchanging (yet contradictory) diagnostic materials that serve as a trajectory for stabilizing
behavioral abnormalities only represent minimal examples in the plethora of tremors
which represent revolt of traditional Western adherence and therefore, its rationality.
Alienation and Ostracism. Michel Foucault’s classic analysis of the arrangement and
social function of the insane in Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason (1964) clears the smoke of disillusioned fear regarding the imagery
associated with the dark recesses of the mind. Concurrently, Foucault’s (1964)
arrangement and social function prove to facilitate the following description of the
fourth level of social adhesion (Figure 3.1, p. 32) and therefore will be utilized to
10

In the play “No Exit” (1944), Jean-Paul Sartre demonstrates an alternative perspective

of hell -- a customizable eternal suffering contoured to the individual’s fears and their
ultimate demise.
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demonstrate its practicality.

“To inhabit the reaches long since abandoned by the lepers, they chose a
group that to our eyes is strangely mixed and confused,” (Foucault, 1964,
p. 45).

Prior to the alienation of the insane during the Classical period (which Foucault
regards as the period between 1660 and the end of the 19th century), leprosy was the
scapegoat of the largest social fear and religious sacrifice. Lepers were collected from
their village and driven to colonies located on the outskirts of the perimeter, where their
lives would only remain in the company of the like until their deteriorative demise.
Their infliction is both the largest social fear and religious sacrifice because it is a direct
form of lifelong suffering by reason of moral evil’s flaw and fault. Therefore, to assist
the leper is to alleviate the load of their mortal suffering of all men – a direct sin against
a monotheistic God, which threatens the survival of man. As it relates to the hierarchy,
fear is associated with religion to eliminate contestation of the unknown, or from feeling
sympathy towards the outcast, out of a stronger innate drive of self-preservation and
social responsibility.

“He did not come from the solid land, with its solid cities; but indeed from
the ceaseless unrest of the sea, from those unknown highways which
conceal so much strange knowledge, from that fantastic plain, the
underside of the world,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 12).
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Foucault describes a “ship of fools” (e.g. Narrenschiff; p. 8) during the late
1600s through the eighteenth century which collected and housed the village’s insane
and then cast them off to meander the seas and foreign lands. A league of abandoned
cargo, unaware of their own being and void of reason and contribution, is cast to eternal
drifting as a symbol of what could become of man. In this way, the crew of the ships
could be within tangible sight – an ever-present threat – while remaining at a distance.
Their lifestyle and behavior became the distinction of alien; identical to their land
dwellers, yet alien in what represents truth and rationality. The identification of a leper
was visually obvious, whereas the identification of the insane became a struggle, and the
biggest fear, in and of itself. The struggle to differentiate the difference between man of
moral and rational merit and their mentally defective, unrational neighbor became a fear
of identification because the distinction worthy of ostracism was not immediately and
physically present during the transition of taboo. Moreover, this transition from physical
to spiritual, and eventually psychological, flaw and fault rejects past distinctions in
exchange for an affliction that may possess anyone without discrimination or
presumption.
An intriguing transition of placement (and therefore function) of the social pariah
takes place during the Classical period -- a migration to the center. The fear associated
with the leper penetrated the physical and spiritual gambit while it simultaneously dulled
the edge of mercy within individuals and society. The association with leprosy means a
sentence of lifelong alienation; leprosy represents a diseased body. The leper’s function
within society remains along the outskirts, an outlier in the construction of social
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adhesion, but as its presence declined so did the underlying fear. Furthermore, the
Renaissance signaled a birth of sophistication not previously acquired by society -- a
cultural progression where death no longer perpetually loomed ominous concern, so it
likewise must become a covert concept and concern.
The folly of the madman was paramount in tales and fables as he represented the
realization of the ever-present concept of death and apocalypse. Prior to the
Renaissance, insanity served a purposeful function within society; as Foucault (1964)
describes, “Madness is the great tromp l’oeil in the tragic structures of preclassical
literature,” (p. 34). In regards to the underlying message detailed through folly, the
madman knew the unavoidable, ominous truth of innate darkness and demise. However,
only through illusory could the truth be accepted while contextual reality is regarded as
“a new madness that had just come into [man’s] head,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 31-32,
brackets added). The cultural development of thought that followed the Renaissance
demonstrates a deviation from ominous death and survival; folly was abandoned and the
madman directly represented death and the darkness of man. As a result, the impugned
madman begins to take over center stage but cannot replace the leper, so it must
supersede the leper as social concerns shift; therefore, the function of death and the
bestial demise within man and society must coincide with placement, ergo
centralization.
This centralization of the spectacle of insanity serves more than one function:
immediacy of fear, dehumanization (discussed later), and a physical representation in
relation to the human anatomy. The latter is quite philosophical in its explanation and
differentiation, but it should be introduced firstly to demonstrate the comparison of the
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human body to totem. In short, the situation of mortal fault and ailment is located
accordingly to its anatomy, physically and geographically; moreover, the effectiveness
of analogy demands parallel contingencies that are likewise perpendicular (the
importance of nature, which Foucault describes as orderliness). Foucault explains that
“He [the madman] is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely,” (1964, p. 10,
brackets added); or more specifically, the individuals who are believed to be mad are
made spectacles within the public’s protected interior. A leper is visually identifiable by
their symptoms of a diseased body, which cannot be tamed or controlled; moreover, the
layout of the village placed the lepers along the perimeter, or the exterior.
Concurrently, the attempts to alienate the madman from society originally
underwent a similar process until the differentiation between madness and unrationality
demonstrated that dominance via policing can tame madness. The inflammatory
organization of words and imagery (i.e., “ship of fools”) along with the success of
taming insanity’s bestial behavior, repurpose curious fear into social utility (Foucault,
1964); thus, the placement of the madman migrates to the center of villages, towns, and
cities. The madman, whose inflictions wary from within, make him perceivably different
from all others by his innate essence of being – from his core. Therefore, inasmuch as
there is a need for the insane to effectively replace the leper, the need for proximal
relocation is just as important. In essence, madness surrounds society and engulfs it in
fearful curiosity because the madness of man could be tamed for utility and observation.
Ergo, demonstrating the strength of nature11 and authority of rational man in the face of
11

Nature, as it is regarded by Foucault (1964), is understood to encompass order and

rationality – which appears quite contradictory to chaotic unruliness that results in an
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perceived threat is quite a powerful tool of security.
Madness is feared because it threatened the preservation of life and contested
rationality; it is a reminder of the Dark Ages, which functions as moral detest for the
past and the greatest cultural coagulant towards progression. Furthermore, the seismic
transition from concern about diseased bodies to a diseased mind reveals the changing
dynamics of social consciousness, culture, and the importance of normal behavior.

The Construction and Transition of Madness
“There must have formed, silently and doubtless over the course of
many years, a social sensibility, common to European culture, that
suddenly began to manifest itself in the second half of the
seventeenth century; it was this sensibility that suddenly isolated
the category destined to populate the places of confinement,”
(Foucault, 1964, p. 45).

The underpinnings of Marcuse’s (1964) analysis of dimensionality align quite
well with Foucault’s (1964) analyses of the economic utility of idle bodies. To be
specific, idleness is “the mother of all evils,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 53) – it is the inability
to follow civil law and abide by what is accepted to be sacred by the majority of
society. Marcuse explains the overall utility of competitively laboring, malleable bodies
that lubricate the gears of productivity and persist the social importance of a prosperous
absence of human intervention. However, society depicts nature as orderly and rational; a
direct contribution of human intervention and social consciousness for self-preservation.
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work ethic. Self-worth is associated with the moral obligation of employment and those
individuals who appear incapable of absorbing that responsibility are labeled as social
deviants. Foucault (1964) posits that the notion of confinement begins in the mid-17th
century as an economic solution to the problem of idle bodies; confinement forces
productivity and prosperous contribution by those who would otherwise refute moral
obligation while reducing labor costs. Idleness becomes of specific social concern
during the Classical period due to the imperative nature behind economic growth and
sophistication, and it is here where the concept of productivity and power becomes the
great social bond towards advancement.
The Classical period is a time in which society aims to define the contingencies
and existence of normalcy while attempting to separate those viewed as abnormal. It is
possible to parallel Marcuse’s (1964) and Foucault’s (1964) perspectives of
incongruence with social expectations and its consequences with the abstract thinking of
the social deviants who apparently contest the myopic choices given to them. A more
likely possibility is that their position and function within society is resituated based on
the context of social importance and concern. “To inhabit the reaches long since
abandoned by the lepers,” Foucault remarks, “they chose a group that to our eyes is
strangely mixed and confused,” (1964, p. 45). Under the façade of the Hospital General,
which “had nothing to do with any medical concept,12” (p. 40), the first established
workhouse in France was associated with a condemnation of idle behavior in lieu of
12

Foucault continues that the Hospital General “…was an instance of order, of the

monarchical and bourgeois order being organized in France during [the Classical]
period,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 40, brackets added).
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ailing “all contagious invalids,” (p. 44). Instead, the individuals who would find
themselves under the thumb of authoritarian constraint were the unemployed, the poor,
libertines, and the mad.
Handling civil disobedience became a problem of the city during the Classical
period, and their solution became confinement. Confinement, under the rouse of a
medical facility, held “economic significance” (p. 50) by forcing civil law upon those
who would not accept it. In these workhouses, the beast-like quality of madness is
policed to instill a notion of morality and religious abidance while concealing the city’s
shame into a single infrastructure. By creating a “safe haven” to house the mad (amongst
other social deviants), society is able to standardize the constituents of “normalcy”
through what it is not. The question then becomes, how did the city’s shame become
associated with the mad? The function of the madman shifts from one of utility in folly
to deviance and fear; confinement becomes an establishment to which the desire for
control, the construction of concrete borders for normative behavior, and an
exemplification of elitist control becomes paramount in the awakening of a new age of
sophistication.
The Dehumanizing “Gaze”. The notion of confinement is related to a refinement of
technologies, taxation, and a stabilized government. By registering a city’s inhabitants,
the elitist class has an accessible route within privacy and a commodity of power by
exclusion. Likewise, the ability to confine a population of ostracized individuals reflects
an expanding population, an expanding army and an overall societal vanity. The
contradiction to highlight within this assumption is what Foucault (1964) defines as a
“madness of vain presumption” (p. 29), which infects all men. If this specific sector of
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madness is “… a delusive attachment that enables him to grant himself all the qualities,
all the virtues or powers he lacks,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 29), how then, is the “normal”
population of society any different than the madman who is caged? At first glance, it
would appear impossible to confine an entire society but upon closer inspection, it is
already enacted. By defining one group’s stereotypes and perceived inadequacies, it
indeed isolates the “other” through constriction and vanity.

“Madness had become a thing to look at: no longer a monster inside
oneself, but an animal with strange mechanisms, a bestiality from
which man had long since suppressed,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 70).

The fascination with the madman during the Classical period concerned the
resilience and tolerance to what destroyed established men; the madman’s animalistic
qualities supersede his own humanity, therefore making the possibility of perceiving the
madman as a beast justifiable. Confinement hid most scandals, but it “explicitly drew
attention to madness, pointed to it,” (p. 70); this spectacle of organizing madmen within
the facility of the workhouse made it possible to perform public exhibitions. However,
by utilizing public exhibition as a spectacle, it defined and controlled not only the social
sphere of the madman, but that of its observers. The scandal behind confining and
displaying the mad to the public sparks curiosity; to see the fragile line between nature
and the ultimate human demise is frightening yet seductive. In a way, the madman
represents a fear of the past and a fear of reprimand, and curiosity embodies a drive to
seek its derivative.
43

Madness appears to shift from a civil disobedience, to a disease of the body, and
ultimately a disease of the mind. The solution to the contradiction of madness within
confinement represents itself in the form of the asylum beginning at the dawn of the
nineteenth century. The madman has absolute freedom because he does not live by the
same laws and morals that are contextually-based and accepted by the majority of
society; the concerns and pains of the madman are not the same as the modern man. The
madman is an anarchist and the anti-Christ, which therefore makes him dangerous to the
preservation of modernity and temporal progression. The period of Enlightenment
however, encourages curiosity to seek rationality by organizing the madman to observe
and explain that which is diseased (i.e., the mind), but it still makes the madman quasiinvisible in its symptomology.
A concern has to be recognized as such by examining its disruption in society
and enforcing the control via intervention; its threat to comfort and life as it is known at
any point in time has to be made an imperative by stating its purpose. In order to
understand the transition from fear to curiosity and knowledge, a broader range of its
formulation must be examined. Foucault’s (1963) publication titled The Birth of the
Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception gives way to the introduction of
scientifically investigating madness by first unearthing the mysterious prestige of the
medical field. The sophistication which accompanied the Classical period, along with a
growing population and army, obsesses over the contingencies of normalcy and
segregating that which is not. This segregation, however, occurs on numerous levels and
the gaze of the medical practitioner initiates from within and spreads throughout.
The “rational order of diseases” (Foucault, 1963, p. 7) is botanical in nature. The
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anatomy of the human body is essentially transformed into a rationale of developmental
order, and it allows the physician to communicate with the development of the disease
without interacting with the patient. The gaze of the physician lifts the veil of the
uncertainty behind diseases and it is the gaze that reveals the truth of order. Moreover,
the human body becomes a means to an end in the form of manifested symptoms and
experimentation; the patient becomes a transparent translator for that which cannot
speak. The patient and their human qualities are therefore dissolved, much like the
abolishment of humanity in the madman, and thus becomes a “rediscovered portrait,” (p.
15) of a familiar ailment.
The patient becomes secondary to the disease, but an unavoidable disturbance
which must be tolerated and parenthesized (Foucault, 1963). The truth lies within the
disease because it can be observed within the nature of the human body; it follows a
path, insofar as it does not mutate, which is recognizable to the physician whereas the
patient is not. Moreover, the patient becomes a trivial, external fact during the gaze
which prompts to preserve their life. “The rationality of life,” Foucault remarks, “is
identical with the rationality of that which threatens it,” (1963, p. 7). More specifically,
the knowledge of diseases works in conjunction with the recognition of health because it
is from one rationale that the other can be understood. It is here that the disease and
physician share the scaffold and spectacle; it is here where diseases can be organized
and life can be monitored.
The Containment of Madness. The context of the word “hospital” has transitioned
quite dramatically since the seventeen century and so has its specific population, but the
theme of concealment is still tangible. During the Classical period, hospitals were not
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geared towards the rehabilitation of ill patients; moreover, illness was turned away from
admission within their guarded fortresses. The best environment for a disease to be
controlled was within the home where it cannot perpetuate and spread, but this rationale
is somewhat contradictory for both diseases and madness. Contradictions geared
towards the condemnation of housing diseases, which are to be eradicated from the body
and population, would make the relationship between the physician and their gaze a
short-lived relationship throughout the entire span of human existence. The knowledge
obtained through the observation of that which threatens life would be trivial and
archaic, but that knowledge appears to be far from its truth and utility. In fact, the
knowledge of diseases expands into numerous disciplines that claim the same purpose –
to manage life and examine its antithesis.
Society maintains contextual truths as such by accepting the premises of its
contingencies, which is dependent upon who delivers those contingencies as truths (e.g.,
expertise and wisdom). Contrary to the condemnation of institutionalizing diseases, the
institutionalization of insanity poses to eradicate its existence among the general
population and organizes its role within society. As previously mentioned, the scope of
insanity within the social sphere contextually migrates from a dark secret of man, to a
disease of the body, and ultimately a disease of the mind. Concurrently, the body of the
madman shifts from the figure of social utility of truths (i.e. tales and fables), to civil
disobedience (i.e., confinement), to covert force within the asylum. As the role of the
gaze expands to an expertise of the mind, there appears to be a transition from the
movement of humors, to a tension of nerve fibers, to ultimately a psychological
explanation of truths (Foucault, 1964).
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The Seven Still-Frames
“Data from the 2001-2002 National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol
and Related Conditions suggest that approximately 15% of the U.S.
adults have at least one personality disorder,” (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p.
646).
DSM-I (APA, 1952) Personality Disorders
"The Personality pattern disturbances are considered deep seated disturbances, with
little room for regression. Personality trait disturbances and Sociopathic personality
disturbances under stress may at times regress to a lower level of personality
organization and function without development of psychosis," (American Psychiatric
Association, 1952, p. 34-35).
Personality
Sociopathic
Personality pattern
Special symptom
trait
personality
disturbances
reaction
disturbances
disturbances
Emotionally
Inadequate personality
unstable
Antisocial reaction
Learning disturbance
personality
PassiveSchizoid personality
aggressive
Dyssocial reaction
Speech disturbance
personality
Cyclothymic
Compulsive
Sexual deviation
Enuresis
personality
personality
Personality
Addiction
trait
Paranoid personality
(Alcoholism, Drug
Somnambulism
disturbance,
addiction)
other
Other
Transient situational personality disorders
"This general classification should be restricted to reactions which are more or less
transient in character and which appear to be an acute symptom response to a situation
without apparent underlying personality disturbance," (American Psychiatric
Association, 1952, p. 40).
Transient situational personality
Adjustment reaction of childhood
disturbance
Gross stress reaction
I.
Habit disturbance
Adult situational reaction
II.
Conduct disturbance
Adjustment reaction of infancy
III.
Neurotic traits
Adjustment reaction of late life
Adjustment reaction of adolescence
Table 3.1, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-I (APA, 1952).
47

Albeit the intended purposes of the new diagnostic manual are aimed towards
active duty and veteran military personnel, it manages to become a sophisticated,
sovereign gaze of the twentieth century. Trivial words such as “adequate”, “social”, and
“stable”, which naturally hold a mundane position in the English vernacular, begin to take
on a derogatory connotation to anyone labeled as such when they are accompanied by a
negative prefix. The Second World War left unanswered questions regarding shared
insanity by a nation and a backwash of its shell-shocked troops returned to their homes,
garlanded with albatrosses. The consequences of war, however, would leave its
impressions upon a civilization long after the extravagant pride of congregated Allied
forces finalized sanctions. The publication of the first DSM in 1952 (American Psychiatric
Association) marks the first consensus of Americanized sensationalism through behavioral
reprimand, but it would surely not be the last.
Personality disorders, the American Psychiatric Association (1952) assumes, “…
are characterized by developmental defects or pathological trends in the personality
structure, with minimal subjective anxiety, and little or no sense of distress,” (p. 34).
Specifically, at the time of publication, personality disorders are not attributed to external
variables or one’s internal interpretation. Similar to the attribution of insanity provided by
the family, which Foucault (1964) describes about the inspection of diseased minds,
personality disorders are attributed to be particular to the individual and their family. The
first group of disorders, personality pattern disorders, describes a reluctance of the
individual’s personality to ever be altered or alleviated, with its only direction being a
downward slope into psychosis. The second group, personality trait disturbances,
encompasses disorders where individuals have an inability to manage their “emotional
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equilibrium and independence under minor or major stress,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. 36)
due to an interruption during emotional development.
Individuals classified with personality trait disturbances are diagnosed according to
a “fixation and exaggeration of certain character and behavior patterns,” (DSM-I; APA,
1952, p. 36) or increasingly simplify in behavior due to external (environmental) or
internalized stress. Moreover, evidence of “physical immaturity” (p. 36) tends to
supplement an indication of an underlying personality impediment. The third group,
sociopathic personality disturbances, posits that individuals are unable to socialize and
conform to “the prevailing cultural milieu” (p. 38). Unable to find comfort in their own
skin or in relationships with others, individuals diagnosed with sociopathic personality
disorders are perceived more often to have a high comorbidity rate with both personality
trait and pattern disturbances. Transient situational personality disorders appear to be a
set of diagnoses likewise known as defense mechanisms; their acute reactions are
responsive to scenarios and “transient in character” (p. 40). Furthermore, experience to
similar situations is a means of adapting and thus, symptoms will recede as stress declines.
During a conversation with a trusted mentor, it became abundantly clear that this
style of accompanying words and their observed symptoms can be aptly known as
objectivity with a vengeance. Objectivity with a vengeance positions objectivity as
negative by nature, but the physicians who define the contingencies of personality
disorders observe its symptoms from a distance. In methodological research, this
“distance” is justified as observational – where the natural discourse of events remains
pure of influence. The physicians assume a point of view that is “neutral”, yet the
physician never wants to know what the lived experience is in order to deviate from any
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positive outcome. In this way, the primitive dichotomy of “healthy/not healthy” and
“normal/abnormal” is sustained and culturally preserved over the course of more than
sixty years within arbitrary text. Furthermore, this dichotomy is elaborated in more depth
within the course of eighteen years, and personality disorders begin to form an entity
separate from sexual deviancies and addictions.
DSM-II (APA, 1968) Personality Disorders
"This group of disorders is characterized by deeply ingrained maladaptive patterns of
behavior that are perceptibly different in quality from psychotic and neurotic symptoms.
Generally, these are life-long patterns, often recognizable by the time of adolescence or
earlier." (American Psychiatric Association, 1968, p. 41).
**"In DSM-I 'Personality Disorders' also included disorders now classified under Sexual
deviation, Alcoholism, and Drug dependence," (American Psychiatric Association, 1968,
p. 42)
Paranoid personality
Cyclothymic personality
((Affective personality))

Obsessive compulsive
personality ((Anankastic
personality))
Hysterical personality
(Histrionic personality
disorder)

Passive-aggressive
personality
Inadequate personality

Schizoid personality

Asthenic personality

Other personality
disorders of specified
types (Immature
personality )

Explosive personality
(Epileptoid personality disorder)

Antisocial personality

[Unspecified
personality disorder]

Table 3.2, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-II (APA, 1968).
A few notable differences exist between the first and second editions of the
diagnostic manual, particularly the addition of new diagnoses, the elimination of clustered
categories, as well as the relocation of sexual deviation, alcoholism, and drug dependence
into a new classification. New diagnostic additions in the second edition include explosive
personality disorder, hysterical/histrionic personality disorder, asthenic personality
disorder, immature personality, and those personality disorders that cannot be specified.
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Moreover, compulsive personality disorder tends to teeter with obsession throughout the
history of the diagnostic manual’s existence. In the DSM-I, compulsive personality
disorder is described as a “chronic, excessive, or obsessive concern with adherence to
standards of conscience or of conformity,” (APA, 1952, p. 37) which renders an individual
unable to easily relax and may be the result of behavioral patterns first introduced during
their adolescence. By 1968, the disorder is coupled with an “obsessive” element yet
remains contextually similar in symptomology as its predecessor.

“… The idea of hysteria is a catchall for the fantasies, not of the
person who is or believes himself ill, but of the ignorant doctor who
pretends to know why,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 139).

Contrary to the first edition of the DSM, the second edition includes hysterical
personality disorder, more popularly known as histrionic personality disorder. The
symptoms, as stated by the DSM-II (APA, 1968), are characterized by “excitability,
emotional instability, over-reactivity, and self-dramatization […] ...immature, selfcentered, often vain, and usually dependent on others,” (p. 43, brackets added). In
Foucault’s (1964) analysis of madness, there are four core aspects of madness: mania,
melancholy, hysteria, and hypochondriasis. The transition of attributing madness from one
of movement of animal spirits, to a movement of humors, to nerve fiber tensions and
ultimately a disorder of the psyche dedicated long hours to creating rationality for its
occurrence. In specific, hysteria (which translates to “wandering uterus”) afflicted
individuals (particularly women) with “soft bodies” (Foucault, 1964, p. 121), a condition
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associated with idle bodies which perspire less and therefore contain toxins (i.e., heat,
animal spirits, and humors) which must be equilibrated or expelled. As a result of the soft
body’s exposure to excitation or trauma, it has a seismic effect upon the body and thus
more difficult to recover, if ever.
Attention should also be directed towards the transience of homosexuality as a
mental disorder, which prior to the publication of the first DSM, was religiously
condemned as a mortal evil (i.e., sodomy) worthy of an express ticket to hell. Moreover,
homosexuality (and sexual deviancies in general) is previously classified by physicians as
“psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. 39). By the
time of the first publication of the DSM, homosexuality is classified as a priority sexual
deviance under the category of sociopathic personality disturbances. In the second edition
of the DSM, sexual deviation is separated from personality disorders and houses a set of
diagnoses within its own identity. However, there is not a set of symptoms available to
assist in diagnosing an individual with such a sexual deviation. Instead, the broader
classification of sexual deviation implies that albeit the deviant behaviors are considered
grossly bizarre by many, the individual is “unable to substitute normal sexual behavior for
them,” (DSM-II; APA, 1968, p. 44). More specifically, by deviating from normal sexual
behavior, one believably forfeits their gender and thus contesting culturally-based values.
Considering the background of hysteria and homosexuality, the continued transience of
the latter and the addition of hysterical personality disorder within the second edition of
the DSM is thus an insult and a sexist method of preserving primitive gender scripts.
After reviewing contextual differences between DSM-I (APA, 1952) and DSM-II
(APA, 1968), one thing becomes abundantly clear – the word “individual” transitions to
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“patient” within its diagnostic definitions. By placing the individual within a set of
parenthesis, it becomes easier to depersonalize the human being and all of their qualities
from the disorder, in order to further distance experience from neutrality. For example, the
sophistication of context between DSM-I and DSM-II in their description of antisocial
personality disorder paints an image of an individual with political undertones appropriate
to their era – dusking of WWII and McCarthyism (i.e., “Red Scare”, and Cold War). The
imagery and context associated with fascists, communists, and Nazis has somehow been
boiled down into behaviors that encapsulate an entire civilization and work against
American civilians: trouble-making, callous, pleasure-seeking, selfish, and an inability to
learn from experience or punishment. Furthermore, the depth of specificity from one
definition to its successor reveals a normative belief structure that condemns “significant”
deviations from standardized (or normal) behavior and its potential threat to the general
population.
To briefly transition before discussing the third edition of the DSM, an important
chain of political events, followed by an equally important document, deserves to be
brought to attention. In June of 1968, the United States experienced an uproar from the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer community: Stonewall riots in the
Greenwich Village (The Leadership Conference, 2009). As a result of police officers
harassing a few patrons attending a popular gay bar, a riot broke out and continued for
several days after. Following the anniversary of this event, a band of gay pride parades
occurred in several major cities, including San Francisco, and the liberation ensued. The
voice of an oppressed group began to gain amplification, which grabbed the attention of
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the American Psychiatric Association. Between the second and third editions of the DSM,
the American Psychiatric Association released a statement of revision:
Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation Disturbance:
Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, page 44
302.0 Sexual orientation disturbance (Homosexuality)
This category is for individuals whose sexual interests are directed
primarily toward people of the same sex and who are either disturbed by, in
conflict with, or wish to change their sexual orientation. This diagnostic category
is distinguished from homosexuality, which by itself does not constitute a
psychiatric disorder. Homosexuality per se is one form of sexual behavior and,
like other forms of sexual behavior which are not by themselves psychiatric
disorders, is not listed in this nomenclature of mental disorders.
Figure 3.2, Opening statement for the rationale regarding a proposed change of
homosexuality and revision of APA nomenclature for the DSM-II (Document Reference
No. 730008; Washington, D.C.: APA, 1973).
Dr. Robert Spitzer, a member of the APA Task Force on Nomenclature and
Statistics, formulates the rationale in response to rising controversy regarding
homosexuality as a “pathological deviation of normal sexual development or as a normal
variant of the human potential for sexual response,” (p. 1). The argument for the inverse
is that the classification of homosexuality under any regards as a psychiatric disorder is
“scientifically incorrect” and that it manipulates the relationship between the homosexual
community and the discipline of psychiatry, as well as justifying non-professional denial
of any and all civil rights. The counterarguments made by those who wish to maintain its
discriminatory classification insist that by succumbing to the persuasion that
homosexuals are not sick, it would discourage imperative treatment. What is critically
paramount within this five-page document is that the American Psychiatric Association’s
members have finally agreed upon a solid definition of what is homosexuality:
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“Homosexuality refers to an interest in sexual relations or contact with
members of the same sex. Some experts in our field believe that
predominant or exclusive homosexuality is pathological; other experts
believe it a normal variant,” (Spitzer, 1973, p. 2).
Furthermore, the following points of agreement made by the APA insist that
while a significant proportion of homosexuals are content with their orientation and show
no signs of psychopathology, a significant proportion of homosexuals are in conflict with
their orientation and desire to change it (Spitzer, 1973). Prior to the above, neither
editions of the DSM have a definition of what homosexuality is clinically symptomized
to be. However, by creating this definition, it has likewise given life to an entity from
which to express condemnation, judgment, and hate. Conversely, the APA describes that
the hate towards homosexuality is internalized by the individual who is in conflict with
their identity and feelings in lieu of its inverse. Yet the question remains – how can an
individual hate themselves without the cue and expectations of their cultural environment
primarily leaning its preferences?
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DSM-III (APA, 1980) Personality Disorders
"It is only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause either
significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or subjective
distress that they constitute Personality Disorders. The manifestations of
Personality Disorders are generally recognizable by adolescence or earlier and
continue throughout most of adult life, though they often become less obvious in
middle or old age." (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 305).
**"The diagnosis of a Personality Disorder should be made only when the
characteristic features are typical of the individual's long-term functioning and
are not limited to discrete episodes of illness." (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980, p. 305)
Cluster I

Cluster II

Cluster III

Paranoid

Histrionic

Avoidant

Schizoid

Narcissistic

Dependent

Schizotypal

Antisocial

Compulsive

Borderline

Passive-aggressive

Atypical, Mixed, or Other Personality Disorder
"If an individual qualifies for any of the specific Personality Disorders, that
category should be noted even if some features from other categories are
present," (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 329).
Atypical
Mixed
Other Personality Disorder
Table 3.3a, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-III (APA, 1980).
The third edition of the DSM (1980), which coincides with the ICD-9-CM (WHO,
1979)13, receives a makeover and augmentation; the third edition contains a staggering

13

The ICD-9-CM (WHO, 1979) is specifically intended for classifications for hospital

coding in the United States, which appears to be somewhat incongruent with
classifications from the ICD-9 and further supplementing the argument of a possible
American Exceptionalism (Scientific Data Documentation; International Classification of
Diseases-9-CM, 1979).
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494 pages, of which 25 pages discuss personality disorders14. Concurrently, personality
disorders are coded as Axis II disorders15 and schizotypal, narcissistic, borderline, and
dependent personality disorders are formally introduced and replace disorders such as
explosive and cyclothymic personality disorders. Upon further examination, there appears
to be an interchangeable relationship between compulsive personality and obsessivecompulsive personality disorder among the first three editions. Likewise, there is a
refinement within the description and classification of histrionic personality disorder
(formerly known as hysterical personality disorder and must be distinguishably different
from hysterical neurosis).
During the 1960s, an investigation of the primary facets of human personality is
investigated with the hopes of confining the abyss of human behavior within a continuum
and its findings lend great utility for personifying personality abnormalities by route of
clustering and external perception. The clustering of personality disorders may appear
trivial at first, but its justification positions that each cluster possesses a specific theme:
“‘odd’ or eccentric,” (Cluster I), “dramatic, emotional, or erratic,” (Cluster II), and
“anxious or fearful” (Cluster III) (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 307). Both personality
disorders specifically discussed below, as well as those not mentioned but present in the
DSM-III, are making a shift from a diagnosis to a perceivable illness; the nosology of
personality disorders are in and of themselves developing a personality. By supplementing
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Table 4.1 (p. 88) in Chapter Four covers the total number of classifications, the total

number of personality disorder classifications, and the total number of pages per version
of the seven DSMs.
15

In the first two editions of the DSM, the utilization of Axes did not exist.
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symptoms with perceivable differences from normalcy (e.g., “stiff”, stubborn, indecisive,
“princess”, femininity), it justifies nonprofessional observation and ultimately, ostracism.
The third edition of the DSM manages to take symptomology a step further; it is apparent
that by elaborating on a personality disorder with more specificity, it parenthesizes the
individual (whom literally transitions to a “patient” in the second edition) and engulfs their
entire life within a derogatory diagnosis.
Dramatic, emotional, erratic personalities appear to make an abrasive impact on
others due to the individual’s perceived inability to conform to rational thinking, with
egocentricism demanding a large part of their identity. Narcissistic personality disorder
makes its formal introduction within the third edition of the DSM (APA, 1980) and is
characterized as a “grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness,” (p. 315).
Furthermore, narcissism is the only negative personality attribute featured in the catalogue
of personality factors16 and it becomes the easiest of the objective traits to impugn.
Foucault (1964) explains that the understanding behind passions is that it drives men to
madness, but passion also directs to mastering human expression through the arts. In
assuming this relationship of passion and madness, an element of narcissism must be
present as an intermediate towards the drive of continued success. However, in regards to
20th century perception of narcissism, it may appear quite irritating to others within the
gambit of absolved social distinctions.
Histrionic personality disorder, formerly known as hysterical personality disorder,
remains quite gender specific – or more realistically, sexist – in its symptomology. In the
16

Narcissism is accompanied with openness to experience, agreeability,

conscientiousness, and extraversion.
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DSM-II, hysterical (histrionic) personality disorder characterizes individuals as
emotionally instable, immature, perpetually attention-seeking and seductive, as well as
prone to self-dramatization (APA, 1968, p. 43). By the publication of the third edition of
the DSM, histrionic personality disorder is explained in more depth (or justified with more
specificity), and describes patients as often assuming the role of the “victim” or “princess”
(DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 313). However, the most incriminating evidence relating to
sexism lies within this sentence: “Flights into romantic fantasy are common; in both sexes
overt behavior often is a caricature of femininity,” (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 314). As
previously mentioned, there is a concrete persistence by the members of the association to
solidify and maintain gender scripts, which likewise impugns the female sex and relates to
the assumption of a higher prevalence for the affliction of “soft bodies” (Foucault, 1964)
as a scientific fact.
The interchangeable relationship between compulsive and obsessive compulsive
personality disorder (and within the disorder, characterized with hyphenation not present
until the fourth edition in 1994) appears to show a conflicting set of standards and
therefore the identity of the disorder is more inconsistent than the affected individual. In
the first edition of the DSM, compulsive personality disorder characterizes individuals as
suffering from a “chronic, excessive, or obsessive concern with adherence to standards of
conscience or of conformity,” (APA, 1952, p. 27). Albeit their behavior may be
“overinhibited, overconscientious, and may have an inordinate capacity for work,” (p. 27),
their hyperanalytical behavior and its characterizations are not viewed as an “invariable
consequence” (p. 27) within a product-driven society. However, in the DSM-II (1968), the
elimination of any benefit within hypervigilant behavior is compensated by augmenting its
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deteriorative aspects: rigidity, hyper-inhibition, hyper-conscientiousness, hyper-dutiful,
and an inability to relax (p. 43). In the third edition of the DSM (1980), a more in depth
description of compulsive personality disorder provides specific characteristics of the
disorder as well as how the general population may perceive such symptoms.
Disorders of Childhood or
Adolescence

Personality Disorders

Schizoid Disorder of Childhood or
Adolescence
Avoidant Disorder of Childhood or
Adolescence

Schizoid Personality Disorder
Avoidant Personality Disorder

Conduct Disorder

Antisocial Personality Disorder

Oppositional Disorder

Passive-Aggressive Personality
Disorder

Identity Disorder

Borderline Personality Disorder

Table 3.3b, Disorders present in children and adolescents, and their manifestation in the
form of a personality disorder upon maturation (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 305).
In the metaphorical black hole of categorization, it is apparent that once an
individual’s behavior is viewed as maladaptive, it remains impossible to escape the
parenthetical paradigm. To further justify the imperative nature of personality disorders,
the DSM-III (1980) explains the discourse behind the manifestation of personality
disorders, which may appear during childhood and adolescence. Above, Table 3.3b is a
correspondence of what the DSM-III warrants as personality disorders being a lifelong
deviation from normal behavior, by lending credibility to its predecessor during
childhood and adolescence. More specifically, if certain features of deviance are present
in children or adolescents, it will mature alongside the chronological maturation of the
individual onward into adulthood. Conclusively and with all respect, the parentheses
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which engulf the patient depersonalize their human qualities and the ellipses within said
parentheses disorient an escape route.
DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) Personality Disorders

"It is only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and
cause either significant functional impairment or subjective distress that
they constitute Personality Disorders.
"The manifestations of Personality Disorders are often recognizable
by adolescence or earlier and continue throughout most of adult life,
though they often become less obvious in middle or old age.
The diagnostic criteria for the Personality Disorders refer to behaviors
or traits that are characteristic of the person's recent (past year) and
long-term functioning since early adulthood. The constellation of
behaviors or traits causes either significant impairment in social or
occupational functioning or subjective distress," (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987, p. 335).

Cluster A

Cluster B

Cluster C

Paranoid
Schizoid

Antisocial
Borderline

Avoidant
Dependent

Schizotypal

Histrionic

Obsessive Compulsive

Narcissistic

Passive aggressive

Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (NOS)
Table 3.4a, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-III-TR (APA, 1987).
In 1983, the American Psychiatric Association arguably begins to revise the third
edition of the DSM, upon the context of knowledge and understanding as a single still
frame in time. The purposes for revision include inconsistent diagnostic in comparison to
findings of new research, as well as unclear, inconsistent, and contradictory criteria
between categories (APA, 1987). More importantly, the APA claims that the World
Health Organization requests their expertise in contributing to the mental disorders chapter
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of the ICD-10 “which is expected to go into effect around 1992,”17 (DSM-III-R; APA,
1987, p. xvii). Therefore, in order to capture a “current still frame” (and avoid
embarrassment via contradiction from archaic data) that will in turn reflect itself within
the ICD-10, assemblies of “experts” organize into committees with the mission to review
and make suggestions for the revised edition of the third DSM.
The following question might be, “Why is there a revised edition of the third DSM
instead of a fourth edition of the DSM?” The DSM-III-R warrants the defense of
coinciding with the future ICD-10; perhaps this is to strengthen its own credibility and
practicality, while separating itself from other countries. This particular separation is
essential to defining the competing expectations of Western science and research while
pinpointing the derivations of American behavior. The United States, which is
approaching the horizon of a spring equinox after a long Cold War, consequentially (or
beneficially, depending on one’s stance) does not make the DSM universal but it does
develop an ideation of American supremacy based on knowledge. In this way, by
continuously redefining itself and seeking confirmation via textual conformity, the DSM
is always a present figure living in the future tense.
The introduction of the DSM-III-R states that the “DSM-III was intended
primarily for use in the United States, but it has had considerable influence
internationally,” (APA, 1987, p. xviii). However, personality disorders remain strictly
applicable to American standards due to differences of definably normal based on social
expectations, as well as conflictions with religious interpretation which may translate as
17

The publication of the ICD-10 occurred in 1992 but the use of the ICD-10 by WHO

Member States did not begin until 1994.
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normal given the context. Moreover, to objectively observe and thus dictate the
constituents of normal behavior among other sociocultural groups, given that the APA
cannot harmoniously contend to what is normal behavior for Americans, makes the
argument of universality invasive and moot.
In the revised edition of the third DSM, there are a few changes made to the Axis
II personality disorders, most of which are philosophical in argument. The first, and most
obvious, is the inclusion of personality disorders that are not otherwise specified. Prior to
this diagnosis, or a lack of compliance to other diagnoses, the DSM-II (APA, 1968) is the
last edition of the DSM to include a “catchall” section. Moreover, the DSM-III (APA,
1980) created three categories within its catchall: atypical, mixed, and other personality
disorders. Atypical personality disorder is assigned to individuals when the clinician
perceives a personality disorder to be present, yet cannot decipher which disorder it may
be. Mixed personality disorder is used for individuals who have features from several
designated personality disorders present, yet cannot meet the criteria for any single
diagnosis. Lastly, the classification of other personality disorder is assigned to an
individual at the disposal of the clinician when there is a perceivable personality disorder
present but it does not fit within a specific classification, yet deemed as appropriately
necessary (e.g., masochistic, or impulsive) (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 330).
Similar to the passage (p. 23) by Foucault (1964, p. 139) regarding hysteria, the
diagnosis of “not otherwise specified” is a fantasy for the physician who pretends to hold
expertise and knowledge, not for the individual whom believes themselves to be ill. Its
conditional diagnosis indicates that an example of the given catchall is, “features of more
than one specific Personality Disorder that do not meet the full criteria for any one, yet
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cause significant impairment in social or occupational functioning, or subjective
distress,” (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987, p. 358). More or less, the three diagnoses present in
the third edition of the DSM under atypical, mixed, and other personality disorders are
combined into a single diagnosis in order to avoid repetition and the likelihood of
differential diagnoses for trivial criteria requirements. After all, the DSM is only a tool to
guide the clinician but it does not mean that there is consistency from one clinician to the
next.
Humans are very social creatures and their identity and behavior is assumed and
modified based on the feedback from others. Symbolic interactionism, as pioneered by
George Herbert Mead (1934), dictates that reality is a social development provided
through interaction with others. Moreover, individuals do not react to objects or one
another based on their literal position but rather through their understanding of it. Society
and the individual cannot be separated because of its consistent interaction and
adjustment to one another, but intermediate variables may act as deciding factors. The
social understanding of the dichotomy of “healthy/not healthy” or “normal/not normal” is
the underpinning of ostracism and the DSM is its intermediary. In specific, personality
disorders act as the deciding factor between the relationship of symbolic interactionism
and ostracism based on the social understanding of what that diagnosis represents.
The opening section of the Axis II personality disorders for both the DSM-III
(APA, 1980) and DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) provide three subsections within its
introduction that push the envelope a bit further and chirp credence to the concept of
objectivity with a vengeance: associated features, age at onset and course, and
impairment. Associated features of personality disorders positions that individuals with a
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personality disorder are frequently “dissatisfied with the impact his or her behavior is
having on others or with his or her inability to function effectively,” (DSM-III-R; APA,
1987, p. 336). In lay terms, others are dissatisfied with the behavior and their feedback is
what creates dissonance within the individual, whom may not regard their behavior as
undesirable or is unable to “modify them despite great effort,” (p. 336). Age at onset and
course relates to the age of recognition of said disorders; “…Personality Disorders by
definition generally are recognizable by adolescence or early adult life and are
characteristic of most of adult life,” (p. 336). Impairment, which relates to the severity of
infliction upon one’s ability, positions that “…impairment in social and occupational
functioning” (p. 336) may be markedly present.
In the DSM-III (1980) and DSM-III-R (1987), associated features and
impairments accompany each disorder alongside variables such as complications,
predisposing factors, prevalence, sex ratio, familial pattern, and differential diagnosis.
Furthermore, based on knowledge of background and research, some disorders may
contain more information than others. The irony becomes jam-locked within the
repetition or ambiguity of each disorder as the whole is deconstructed into parts; a
gestalten conundrum in which the DSM reveals its shortcomings by attempting to provide
a strengthening argument of truth. The product of deconstructing a larger entity reveals
less value and validity to the overall purpose of predictability, to which truths must be
repositioned and accredited to expertise. Below, Table 3.4b exemplifies the consequences
of accentuating the parts in lieu of the whole; the disorders present in children and
adolescents and their manifestation into a personality disorder in adulthood is
significantly reduced as a result of inconsistencies and contradictions:
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Disorders of Childhood or
Adolescence

Personality Disorders

Avoidant Disorder of Childhood or
Adolescence

Avoidant Personality Disorder

Conduct Disorder

Antisocial Personality Disorder

Identity Disorder

Borderline Personality Disorder

Table 3.4b, Disorders present in children and adolescents, and their manifestation in the
form of a personality disorder upon maturation (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987, p. 335).
Lastly, Cluster C personality disorders, which encompasses personalities marked
by anxious or fearful behavior, appears to undergo yet another cosmetic transition in
regards to obsessive compulsive and passive aggressive personality disorder. The former
is accompanied and slowly adjoining with an obsessive component and the latter is absent
of an essential conjoining. Obsessive compulsive personality disorder remains essentially
the same in some regards, but is explained in more depth when accompanied by obsession;
the individual feels incompetent despite perfectionism and accomplishments, pervasively
inflexible, stubborn, “stiff”, and poorly manages time given constraints. Concurrently, the
concept of conformity is still ever present in the diagnosis yet textually eliminated from
the primary criteria and a preoccupation towards rules and trivial details while detaining
pleasure distracts the individual from thinking practically. Likewise, the symptomology is
explained in regards to actions performed and thought processes in order to lean
credibility to the diagnosis and to justify the dichotomy of “normal/not normal” by
professionals and nonprofessionals alike.
Passive aggressive personality disorder, on the other hand, is slowly disintegrating
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by the adjoining seams as research on adolescent behavior demonstrates a diminuendo of
the marked characteristics of passive aggressive disorder as an individual matures in age
and experience. Furthermore, the knowledge or understanding of the disorder as a whole
contains minimal data to support its assumptions. For example, the characteristics of
passive aggressive disorder feature “a pervasive pattern of passive resistance to demands
for adequate social and occupational performance… expressed indirectly rather than
directly,” (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987, p. 356). Individuals labeled as passive aggressive are
often defiant, critical, irritable, “argumentative when asked to do something they do not
want to do,” (p. 357), and resentful towards facilitative information regarding
productivity. Thus, its diagnosis assumes “such people are passively expressing covert
aggression,” (p. 356), which is quite common among adolescents and their attitudes
towards individuals assuming an authoritative role.
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DSM-IV (APA, 1994) Personality Disorders
"A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or
early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment.
Only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause
significant functional impairment or subjective distress do they constitute
Personality Disorders," (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 629).
“A Personality Disorder should be diagnosed only when the defining
characteristics appeared before early adulthood, are typical of the
individual's long-term functioning, and do not occur exclusively during an
episode of an Axis I disorder,” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p.
632).
Cluster A
Cluster B
Cluster C
Paranoid
Schizoid
Schizotypal

Antisocial
Borderline
Histrionic

Avoidant
Dependent
Obsessive-Compulsive

Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (NOS)
Table 3.5, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994).
The publication of the fourth DSM in 1994 coincides with the release of the ICD10 (WHO, 1994), as projected within the introduction of the revised edition of the DSMIII (APA, 1987). The DSM-IV aims to be facilitative across many different settings –
“…inpatient, outpatient, partial hospital, consultation-liaison, clinic, private practice, and
primary care, and with community populations,” (p. xv). In the hopes of “striving for
brevity of criteria sets, clarity of language, and explicit statements of the constructs
embodied in the diagnostic criteria,” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. xv) it implicitly made
digestibility of otherwise intricate concepts easier to comprehend among the general
population. It is questionable, however, to rely so heavily on the congregational
brainstorming of thirteen work groups each comprised of approximately five experts
whose reports were “critiqued by between 50 and 100 advisers, who were also chosen to
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represent diverse clinical and research expertise, disciplines, backgrounds, and settings,”
(p. xv). Despite the critique by many advisers, it is still perfunctory as the limits of the
critique are associated with the breadth and detail given within the reviews.
Once again, personality disorders are characterized as an enduring pattern of
maladaptive behavior which definitively deviates from the norms of their culture and
social expectations. Moreover, personality disorders are to be diagnosed by an “objective”
outsider, which can be anyone with a basic knowledge of the DSM and a certification
degree. According to the preemptive considerations, a diagnosis is sometimes sufficed
through a single interview18, yet more are encouraged in order to decipher what is egosyntonic19, age appropriate (e.g., young adulthood), attributable to sudden loss, or not
associated with complications as the result assimilation given that the “individual’s ethnic,
cultural, and social background” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 631) is one of immigrant
status. Considering the supposed neutrality of the expert, the wisdom inscribed within the
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) also supplements that personality disorders are often genderspecific in prevalence; antisocial personality disorder being more often diagnosed in men
while borderline, histrionic, and dependent personality disorder are diagnosed more often
in women (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 631-632). Given that the designation of personality
disorder prevalence is related to one’s gender (i.e., men or women) in lieu of sex (i.e.,
male, female), it is possible to assume that said maladaptive behaviors are attributed to
18

The DSM-IV also suggests that several interviews should be conducted and spaced out

over time (APA, 1994, p. 630).
19

Ego-syntonic refers to the individual perceiving their personality or its characteristics

as unproblematic (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 631).
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social stereotypes related to scripts and roles of both genders and are not in fact
biological20.
It is during this time that interviews become imperative to assessment more so to
acquire solid data for future editions of the DSM than to accurately diagnose current
afflictions. A pivotal change in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) is the absence of passive
aggressive personality disorder, which, as mentioned above, began to cleave away from its
identity and the social understanding of its role or credible existence during the revised
edition of the third DSM (APA, 1987). The cross-sectional, mimetic effect of passive
aggressive personality with affective and anxiety disorders (while holding the variables of
age, gender, and cultural assimilation constant) often results in more uncertainties and
contradictions rather than solutions. Additionally, passive aggressive personality disorder
potentially may not be distinguishable due to an inability to “reach the threshold” (p. 633)
for qualification as a personality disorder and inconsistency of appearance throughout
one’s life.

20

Contrary to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) advisory against over-diagnosing or

underdiagnosing certain disorders for males or females due to “social stereotypes about
typical gender roles and behaviors” (p. 632), the preconceived notion already exists
through the use of inflammatory criteria.
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DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) Personality Disorders

"A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience
and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the
individual's culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in
adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to
distress or impairment," (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p.
685).

Cluster A

Cluster B

Cluster C

Paranoid

Antisocial

Avoidant

Schizoid

Borderline

Dependent

Schizotypal

Histrionic

Obsessive-Compulsive

Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (NOS)
Table 3.6, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000).
While reviewing and examining the differences as it relates to Axis II personality
disorders between DSM-IV (1994) and its successor, the DSM-IV-TR (2000), the
differences are quite minimal and philosophical at best. Taking into consideration that the
temporal distance between the fourth edition and its textual revision (DSM-IV and DSMIV-TR, respectively) is a mere six years, the elimination or addition of a new classification
of personality disorders may appear quite absurd. That is not to say during the
revision/critique stages that suggestions were not given by proponents who contend that
“the new diagnoses were necessary to improve the coverage of the system by including a
group of individuals that were undiagnosable in DSM-IV or diagnosable only under the
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Not Otherwise Specified rubric,” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000, p. xxviii)21. Adding further
insult to injury, diagnoses included in the ICD-10 “were given somewhat more
consideration than those that were being proposed fresh for DSM-IV,” (p. xxviii). That is
to say, the diagnostic materials from which the United States desired to separate in
decades past now lend more priority than suggestions by proponents critiquing a potential
revision, which may create an air of dissonance between work groups and the review
boards.
The clustered groups appear to be quite arbitrary and trivial, especially given that
the creators of the DSM also question is validity and contend that the system has “serious
limitations,” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000, p. 686). It is possible then to further assume that
the deletion of passive aggressive personality disorder from Cluster C is in part
attributable to severe limitations regarding research, and a lack of cohesion with the other
disorders within that specific cluster. Despite the elimination of passive aggressive
personality disorder, which occurs in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), it is still ever present
under the classification of personality disorders not otherwise specified: “…the
individual's personality pattern meets the general criteria for a Personality Disorder, but
the individual is considered to have a Personality Disorder that is not included in the
Classification (e.g., passive-aggressive personality disorder),” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000,
p. 685; DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 629).

21

The DSM-IV-TR warrants that, “We decided that, in general, new diagnoses should be

included in the system only after research has established that they should be included
rather than being included to stimulate that research,” (APA, 2000, p. xxviii).
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Tables 3.3b and 3.4b demonstrate the relationship between behavioral disorder
diagnoses relating to children and adolescents and their maturation into an inherent and
maladaptive set of personality characteristics. However, this relationship is not textually
present in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or its revised edition, but it is still contextually
understood by most that adhere to the assumption regarding a relationship trap of
parenthetical ellipses. The relationships that are present and documented in the DSM-III
(APA, 1980) and the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987), albeit deteriorated due to questionable
validity and severe limitations, demonstrate that the damage and preconceptions of social
understanding are already set in motion. Ergo, once a concept is embraced as rational,
there is little need to alter its social utility until the contingencies of such demand
adjustment.
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DSM-V (APA, 2013) Personality Disorders

"A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is
stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment,"
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 645).

General Personality Disorder
Theme Trait Personality Disorders:
Cluster A

Cluster B

Cluster C

Paranoid

Antisocial

Avoidant

Schizoid

Borderline

Schizotypal

Histrionic

Dependent
Obsessive
Compulsive

Narcissistic
Other Personality Disorders
Personality Change Due to Another Medical Condition
III.
V.
VII.

I. Labile type
Disinhibited type

II.

Aggressive type

Paranoid type
IV.
Other type

VI.

Apathetic type

VIII.

Combined type
Unspecified type

Other Specified Personality Disorders
Unspecified Personality Disorder
Table 3.7, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-V (APA, 2013).
After much anticipation over the span of nearly 20 years, the most recent edition,
DSM-V (APA, 2013), appears to take a step back into nostalgia as it resembles
classifications of earlier editions of the DSM (particularly the first edition from 1952).
One major justification for the long delay of its presentation argues for the goal of
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“harmonizing” the DSM-V (APA, 2013) with the upcoming publication of the ICD22
produced by the World Health Organization. The reasons for the scientific harmonizing
are as follows: 1) “The existence of two major classifications of mental disorders hinders
the collection and use of national health statistics, the design of clinical trials aimed at
developing new treatments, and the consideration of global applicability of the results by
international regulatory agencies,” (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p. 11); 2) Competition creates
complications in regards to replication “across national boundaries,” (p. 11); and 3) The
DSM-IV and ICD-10 did not always agree in regards to “identical patient populations,” (p.
11). For this reason and others, it is interesting that the creators of the DSM would choose
the concept of harmonization in lieu of synchronicity.
Synchronicity would specifically indicate that there is a sound uniformity within
and between groups, as well as within and between the context of the DSM and ICD. The
entire reason behind developing the DSM and the clinical modifications of the ICD is to
modify classifications based on American standards of behavioral truths. Obviously, it is
difficult to identify a uniform sample of individuals under the assumption of wholly
identical features in one location; it is virtually impossible to identify two identical groups
across national boundaries. For example, life experiences, gender stereotypes, community
and familial structures, belief systems, and the regard held for physicians differ
significantly from the United States and abroad. Likewise, the competition between the
two major classification systems runs the gambit of ethical concerns, applicability and
generalization of research findings and differing cultural interpretations of what is
understood as normal and abnormal stimulates more contradiction than consensus. Thus,

22

Currently, the ICD-11 (WHO, 2017) will not be published for another three years.
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instead of collaborating on the issues of current observation, both major classification
systems compete in the present in order to continue a function of a future agenda. For this
reason and others, it is likewise interesting that the creators of the DSM would choose the
concept of harmonization in lieu of dissonance.
Theme trait personality disorders encompass Clusters A, B, and C which are
essentially the same as those classified in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) and DSM-IV-TR
(APA, 2000), yet the umbrella terminology which encompasses them is unique to the
current edition. Each theme is related to a specific cluster, and each cluster has a set of
traits which differ from other traits; however, the entire umbrella represents an essential
difference of identity from personality changes due to another medical condition and those
that do not fit within the criteria of documented personality disorders. Furthermore, the
possibility of the co-occurring diagnoses (5.7% for Cluster A, 1.5% for Cluster B, 6.0%
for Cluster C, and 9.1% for any of the listed personality disorders; DSM-V; APA, 2013, p.
646) is contradictory given the assumption that each cluster exists in order to differentiate
itself from the others. Given the statistics of co-occurrence and the confounding
information of differential, clustered traits, it should be understood that deviation lies
within the eye of the beholder.
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Figure 3.3, Illustrated depiction of cyclical retrograde (Hunter, 2014).
Cyclical Retrograde. The anecdotal phrase “history repeats itself” may hold an ominous
prophecy regarding the relationship between human behavior and society. A significant
difference within the Axis II personality disorders listed in the DSM-V (APA, 2013)
focuses on the expansion of the lower portion of Table 3.7 – personality changes due to
another medical condition, other personality disorders, and unspecified personality
disorders. An expansion of this magnitude is reminiscent of the first edition of the DSM
published over sixty years ago, which bears the question of cyclical retrograde. As
depicted above in Figure 3.2, the concept of cyclical retrograde represents a recycling
process of resources, starting from archaic dichotomies, and adjusting their concepts to
current context in order to fabricate current growth of understanding towards future
77

endeavors. The horizontal limit represents the ultimate curve capacity of inertia upon
reaching a straight line, and the point of which stabilization must compensate from the
bottom to support the infrastructure. From this point, the cyclical process will continue
upwards until it reaches yet another horizontal limit, and thus expand horizontally from
the base once again. Are we as a society approaching the horizontal limit of knowledge in
respect to human behavior? At this point in time, has an assumption of normalcy through
defining its opponent reached its maximum? What are the future implications of recycling
the past?
The addition of personality change due to a medical condition does not follow the
usual trend of diagnosing personality disorders; the change must be present for at least one
year, it is diagnosable in children, it is not a true disorder, and it is not organic. This
grouping of personality changes represents a shift in personality in lieu of a maladaptive
trait or set of traits, where assessments conclude that the change is a “direct
pathophysiological consequence of another medical condition,” (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p.
682). Moreover, the individual may even recognize the “distress or impairment” which
accompanies their change in personality as a result of the medical condition. The
description of each subtype is based on observation, which appears quite redundant but is
described as such: 1) Labile type represents a predominant feature of affective breakdown
or change; 2) Disinhibited type represents a predominant feature of poor or absent impulse
control; 3) Aggressive type represents a predominant feature of aggressive behavior; 4)
Apathetic type represents a predominant feature of “marked apathy and indifference” (p.
682); 5) Paranoid type represents a predominant feature of “suspiciousness or paranoid
ideation” (p. 682); 6) Other type represents a feature which is “not characterized by any of
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the above subtypes,” (p. 682); 7) Combined type represents the predominance of more
than one feature; and 8) Unspecified type. In reflection, this category of personality
changes should be regrouped with affective disorders given the criteria from which it is
acquired.
General diagnostic criteria for a Personality Disorder
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is
manifested in two (or more) of the following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and
events.
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of
emotional response).
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of
personal and social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment
in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back
at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or
consequence of another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition
(e.g., head trauma).
Table 3.8, General diagnostic criteria for a personality disorder (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p.
646-647).
In Table 3.8, the general diagnostic criteria for a personality disorder is provided in
order for the reader to collect their own opinions regarding the description of a new
subsection of personality disorders presented in the DSM-V (APA, 2014) and its
dissonance in comparison to the above criteria. Even more damaging, and present
throughout the entire span of the seven still-frames, is the absence of success rates for
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coexistence with or potential cures for personality disorder. Personality disorders are such
because they are perceived by others as abnormal and thus brought to the individual’s
attention that may remain otherwise unaware. Post hoc ergo propter hoc23 provides
justification to the general public and the physician alike, where the consequences of
affected individual’s behavior is due to their inability to conform to a prototypical set of
standards (as it relates to normal behavior). After the maladaptive trait is located, it is
because of this deviation that the individual is abnormal and will remain semi-transparent
and therefore ostracized. Moreover, the interaction between the individual, the physician,
and society as a whole will adhere to observing and enacting this set of stereotypical
behaviors because it is understood as reality. In this respect, the physician has created an
infinite liar’s paradox in which a disorder is able to be discovered and understood yet
cannot be reversed or minimized.
Michel Foucault dedicated his academic career to examining the historical
derivation of social abnormalities, their current function, and possible future implications.
By utilizing Michel Foucault (1963, 1964) and borrowing concepts from George Herbert
Mead (1934), new critical positions were formulated in order to explain the current
argument of contextual madness and potentially open windows to release stale catchalls.
In closing this chapter, one may feel a dizzying sensation concerning the questionable
reality and the social position of insanity. In the following chapter, the peak of Hunter’s
(2014) hierarchy of social adhesion, themed medicalization and punishment, will be
discussed. Moreover, Peter Conrad’s (2007) The Medicalization of Society: On the
Transformation of Human Conditions into Treatable Disorders will lend great utility in

23

Latin, which translates to “after this, therefore because of this”.
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transitioning the focus to medicalizing a nation and its impact on the current social
relationship between the population and the medical and pharmaceutical industry. So, just
as the chapter began, it will end with this caption:
“Madness deals not so much with truth and the world, as with
man and whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive,”
(Foucault, 1964, p. 27).
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Chapter Four

“No man chooses evil because it is evil; he only mistakes it for
happiness, the good he seeks,” (Mary Wollstonecraft, 1790, p. 39).

It appears that the unreason within the madman is steadily consistent while their
position within society steadily shifts and the context of abnormality is adaptive. The
arrangement of the previous chapter provides a philosophical ensemble of the
archaeological layers of madness, a concept which at its core still represents a state of nonbeing. The madman, or the insane, appears to never be aware of their state or civil law –
both of which are used against them in their alienation and ostracism. Furthermore, the
approach to the organization and management of the insane adapts at face value, but the
ultimate goal of control survives throughout the centuries. Psychoanalysis, and
psychology overall, expands its sovereign gaze through and over a larger population; the
political and economic spheres of technologically-advanced and advancing Western
cultures, specifically American culture, capitalizes on the management of behavior.
In Chapter Three, the introduction of a new heuristic device, Hunter’s hierarchy of
social adhesion (2014, p. 34), is an analytical tool that demonstrates lower-level social
adhesion, which systematically conforms to maintain seamless contextual synchronicity,
to portray current concreteness and rationality with a futuristic trajectory. Given that the
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device is utilized to critically analyze a possible conception of uniform behaviors and its
functional outliers, there must be a succession of levels, or “rungs”, from the ground-up
that are solidified as social truths and rationality. In order to embrace said truths and
rationale, they must first be internalized; Chapter Two discusses the first three rungs of the
pyramidal device in detail (and revisited in the third chapter) as means to a conformist
end. Moreover, those individuals who apparently cannot internalize civil law are
ostracized and alienated; every quality that is human-like is parenthesized, ergo their
identity and disease is one in the same. Chapter Three utilizes the adjustment of disordered
behaviors listed in the seven editions of the DSM (APA) to exemplify the transitive
placement of the madman from one of spiritual and religious evils to a diseased mind.
Power is given to those who can define and inhibit the possibility of opposition via
monopolization of thought. In this case, power is a very potent form of inhibition because
it is based on suppressing the other from being able to create an alternative. More
specifically, power is sustained by the ability to repackage the perimeters of old
definitions and present them as new by defending that cutting edge research is applied to a
moving target. The United States is a grandiose nation of medical enterprise, or more
specifically, an example of medical jurisdiction elitism. In turn, the DSM is a moving
target within the medical enterprise; it is apparently stable but changes over the course of
time to reflect the vulnerability of the American population. The implications of an everexpanding medical jurisdiction is that it has snowballed into an overarching component of
social control, with implications on both the macro (e.g., economics, hospitalization) and
micro (i.e., shaping self-definitions) scale of social realities. It is imperative for
sociologists to research this growing social concern because the political nature of
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diagnostic criteria is the new American ego, where citizens believe that they are both
vulnerable and dependent upon medicalization, which in turn serves to reaffirm the
position of current composites of knowledge.
In the current chapter, the top of the pyramid – Medicalization and Punishment –
will first be discussed with the assistance of Peter Conrad’s (2007) The Medicalization of
Society to highlight the interwoven relationship between the physician and the patient.
Moreover, a Foucauldian approach will supplement the current argument of politicizing
health via discourse provided by a gaze that is both above and throughout society. Upon
the brief completion of this multifaceted dependence, the rest of the chapter will highlight
the political consciousness of dueling archaic dichotomies and the illusion behind
American Exceptionalism. As a note for the reader, you may ask yourself throughout the
current chapter, “How did we not open our eyes sooner?”
“Medicine must no longer be confined to a body of techniques for
curing ills and of the knowledge that they require; it will also
embrace a knowledge of the healthy man, that is, a study of the
non-sick man and a definition of the model man,” (Foucault, 1963,
p. 34).

Medicalization and Punishment. The top of the pyramid in Hunter’s (2014) hierarchy of
social adhesion describes the final rung of social order and conformity. Medicalization and
punishment describes both the social and individual dependence of pharmaceuticals and
the control of individuals who cannot internalize the code of self-preservation as it is
socially accepted. Foucault (1963) explains that prior to the end of the eighteenth century,
84

the orientation of medicine “related much more to health than to normality,” (p. 35); more
specifically, a prototype representing normality did not yield the same value in
comparison to the restoration from illness. However, by the nineteenth century, the
“prestige of the sciences” (Foucault, 1963, p. 35) creates a priority for normalcy in those
concepts and interventions which function within a standard dichotomy of healthy/not
healthy (or normal/not normal). The rationality for this transition lies within the belief of
society, not the individual, as one that can excel or decline; succeed or degenerate; a
civilization that can make the example or be the example. Indeed, this myopic view is
quite cynical but it is what separates “us” from “them”.
The medical gaze is sovereign; it reigns through society as well as above it, and
within it contains the knowledge of diseases and their maladies. Moreover, the
containment of disease and methods of intervention has become politicized through
specialized government departments, pamphlets, inspectors, and statistics. The doctor is a
means to an end, an instrument, and the “priests of the body” (p. 32); the responsibility of
the church to the ill has now been replaced by the doctor, whose obligation to treating the
sick is a “sacred task” (Foucault, 1963, p. 32) to provide to the nation. The doctor merely
eliminates the individual in order to inspect the disease and its maladies, from which
knowledge will restore the individual back to a state of relative normalcy. It is likewise
from this relationship that the doctor and the patient are dependent in both survival and
legitimacy; they are the spectacle and the scaffold, from which the particular knowledge of
the doctor parallels that of the skilled executioner.
Health and normalcy can only be sustained if managed through control on various
scales; regulations for illness prevention are piously implemented and health inspections
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function at the local level of supervision. Institutions house the insane (i.e., the mentally
ill) while physical illnesses remain domestic, yet the goal is not to indefinitely cure the
individual against the threat of freedom and the exposure of a flawed government.
Moreover, through monitoring the ill and the insane, it is possible for the government to
acquire their information and to maintain their autonomous power as well as the
permanent position of the sacred physician. In summation, the individual’s body is a
prison susceptible to punishment and through its function of maintaining a submissive role
far distanced from liberation.
As society strengthens (and depends upon) its relationship with medicine,
sociology likewise expands to investigate the implications of this relationship. As it relates
to the medical jurisdiction of the twentieth century, Conrad (2007) defines medicalization
as “a process by which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical
problems, usually in terms of illness and disorders,” (p. 4); the growth of which
demonstrates a powerful transformation in Western medicine. Conrad (2007) alludes to a
set of questions which are paramount in the investigation of the impact of expansion of
medical problems, which will be reiterated here: given that the amount of life problems
categorized as a medical concern has skyrocketed in the past fifty years, could this be
interpreted as “a new epidemic of medical problems” (p. 3) or an advancement in the
identification and intervention of existing issues? Or is it possible that a wider range of life
problems have snowballed into diagnosable medical problems despite questionable
legitimacy?
Conrad (2007) explains that “it is important to remember that medicalization
describes a process,” (p. 5); medicalization lies within its conceptualization in regards to
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medical terminology and language, as well as its adoption, application, and treatment
(Conrad, 2007). The growing concern of medicalization in the discipline of sociology
relates to the dozens of arising examples according to gender, personal experiences,
behavior, and age; as such, a “corresponding body of literature has loosely been called […
the] ‘medicalization theory’ (Williams & Calnan, 1996),” (Conrad, 2007, p. 5).
Problematic concerns that arise throughout one’s life are not illnesses or disorders without
being accepted as such, and while medical professionals may hold a large percentage of
influence, “some active agents are necessary for most problems to become medicalized,”
(Conrad, 2007, p. 6). Legitimacy may be quite biased, depending on its substantiality; the
premises of problematic concerns may be objective to the individual (the patient or
physician) or a group and it is often the education provided by the media where the
presence of a perceived medical problem is dispersed.
Medicalization is bidirectional, which means that there exists both an “expansion
of medical jurisdiction” (p. 7) and demedicalization, which occurs as the result of a
problem no longer appearing appropriate to receive medical treatment24 (Conrad, 2007).
The perception of symptoms within a heavily medicalized Western society are distorted to
a point of lower thresholds and less tolerance for the most mild of symptoms, and bodily
distress or discomfort are magnified and reformulated as a legitimate disease (Conrad,
2007). In regards to active agents, cases which arise for medicalization (or
demedicalization) may be accomplished by a social movement, patient organizations, or
24

In regards to demedicalization, there are two cases to arise during the twentieth century

– homosexuality and masturbation, with the former as the result of advocacy and a social
movement (Conrad, 2007).
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even individuals and later adopted by physicians as a disease or illness (Conrad, 2007). “In
recent years,” Conrad (2007) argues, “corporate entities like the pharmaceutical industry
and potential patients as consumers have begun to play more significant roles in
medicalization,” (p. 6). Moreover, it appears to be that medicalization legitimizes life
experiences as being pathological by expanding condition classifications and the
narrowing particularity of what is socially acceptable and normal.
As contended by Conrad (2007) “the greatest social control power comes from
having the authority to define certain behaviors, persons and things,” (Conrad &
Schneider, 1992, p. 8; see Conrad, 2007, p. 8). Medicalization points the focus of the
problem originating from the individual rather than the environment which encompasses
them. It is undeniably easier to diagnose, treat, and rehabilitate the individual than to
appropriate a collective blame and address possible solutions for society as a whole. With
an expanding medical jurisdiction, “medicalization increases the amount of medical social
control over human behavior,” (Conrad, 2007, p. 8) and will ultimately replace all other
forms of social control – ergo, mass sedation. However, the grassroots of medicalization
as it relates to mental health began during the latter half of the nineteenth century, where
accessibility to therapy (disciplined in psychoanalysis) was exclusively for individuals
with a disposable income.
Psychoanalysis and a Political Consciousness
Psychoanalytic therapy, in retrospect, is quite time-consuming and expensive;
typically, therapy includes an intimate, one-on-one appointment with the therapist and
client for approximately one hour, several times per week, over the course of several
months (or more commonly, years). During therapy, the client is encouraged to freely
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associate in order to understand their behavior or motives, which may remain
unconscious, and how it affects their relationships with others and their pattern of
consciousness (American Psychoanalytic Association, 2014). Over the course of these
appointments, the goal of therapy is to establish a safe relationship with the therapist in
order to unearth repressed experiences and analyze how it affects current aspects of the
client’s life. The therapist engages in providing “enlightenment” to the client by providing
insight to their limitations in order to remove said barriers and alter their perception of the
world and themselves. With that in mind, it is undoubtedly exhausting to provide therapy
to several clients over the span of many years and impossible to provide such attention to a
majority of the population. Moreover, psychoanalysis is manipulative as it relates to the
therapist altering the behavior of the client; given that its practice is discriminatively
exclusive in preference for the powerful, the behavior of the elite is structured to be
exemplary.
The dominant class remains relatively exclusive in order to reflect the status quo,
and the transition of the dominant practice from psychoanalysis to psychiatry reflects an
expansion of the sovereign gaze. Psychoanalytical therapy is to the elite as
institutionalization is to the subservient class; accessibility accentuates privilege and the
dueling classes shape the role and function of its counterpart. The first two editions of the
DSM reflect the dominant discipline of psychology at the time of their publications –
psychoanalysis, which contends that personality disorders are the manifestation of
unconscious factors that affect behavior. More specifically, personality disorders distort
the balance of power between the id and superego, so it is the position of the therapist to
take upon the role as the client’s ego. By imposing the identification of what it means to
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be normal, the elite can project an image of superiority and thusly externalize the ego to
the majority in exchange for their internalization of a generic identity. However, it is the
imposition of an American document (i.e., the DSM), formulated by an authority of an
exempt select few, who assemble an extreme form of American Exceptionalism via
unconscious observation.
American Exceptionalism is a sociological theory which warrants that the United
States is a capitalist, democratic country that is qualitatively different from other nations
(Lipset, 1996). Lipset (1996) explains that the United States is the product of revolution
and surrounds itself in “a set of dogmas about the nature of a good society,” (p. 31). More
specifically, the notion of American Exceptionalism entails that the United States and its
people differ from other countries in regards to economic superiority and political
strength, which entitles the United States to be representative of the “correct model” of
aspiration for other countries. As a self-sufficient, autonomous, democratic economy, the
U.S. government gets to define how other countries’ governments are inadequate through
a typology of flaws (e.g., authoritarian, totalitarian) which ultimately extends to their
citizens as well. “Americanism,” Lipset (1996) contends, “as different people have
pointed out, is an ‘ism’ or ideology in the same way that communism or fascism or
liberalism are isms,” (p. 31).
The core of American Exceptionalism is to separate what is good from bad and to
associate this dichotomy with separatism – “us” or “not us”. Americanism is perceivably
quite myopic and vastly different from other nationalists; in specific, it is a country that
does not share an identity based solely on history. To be an American is to accept its
values, nee birthright. Furthermore, Americanism and being an American is an
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“ideological commitment,” (Lipset, 1996, p. 31) in lieu of a sense of community, despite
other political agendas (e.g., communist Englishmen; Lipset, 1996). Moreover, American
conservatism is weak in comparison to European and Canadian polities; in America, an
“obligation of the leaders of society and the economy to protect the less fortunate,”
(Lipset, 1996, p. 35) is a mirage. The allure of Americanism, success, and potential
citizenry is quite appealing to immigrants because they are unconsciously observing from
the valley the function of a nation set on top of a hill. In this regard, those individuals who
are looking from afar in adoration have accepted American values wholeheartedly without
reading the fine print.
Given that the DSM is the product of militarization, it may also be understood that
the military is an extension of politics, and thus, the dichotomy of DSM diagnoses parallel
with dichotomies of political typology. In regards to psychoanalysis, the extent to which
the DSM utilizes such a discipline to develop a model of contextual normality is relatively
weakened by an inability to supplement classifications with scientific research.
Psychoanalysis in the DSM, in turn, is the final “hoorah” of the pre-electronic age and the
transition to psychiatry by the third edition of the DSM (APA, 1980) has political ties
relating to the Cold War, advancing technology, ideologies, and the preservation of
duality. Psychiatry allows for scientific research to expand classifications and the
elaboration of abnormal human behavior; more broadly, to reform typology to something
that is new and fresh yet biologically confirming of past biases and status quo. Moreover,
the DSM and its current discipline of psychiatry maintains the status quo because it is
etiologically the same, yet garbed in unchallenging scientific research that is confirmed as
legitimate because it is functional to the existence of American Exceptionalism.
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Number of Diagnoses, Number of Personality Disorders Diagnoses, and Total Number
of Pages in the DSM Versions I-V (American Psychiatric Association, 1952-2013)

Version

Year

Total
Number of
Diagnoses

Total
Number of
Personality
Disorders

Total Number of Pages
(Total Number of
Pages for Personality
Disorder Diagnoses)

I
1952
106
24
130(8)
II
1968
182
12
134(3)
III
1980
265
14
494(25)
III-R
1987
292
12
567(23)
IV
1994
297
11
886(44)
IV-TR
2000
365
11
915(44)
V
2013
380
13
947(39)
Table 4.1, Number of diagnoses, number of personality disorder diagnoses, and total
number of pages in the DSM versions I-V (APA, 1952-2013), adapted from Mayes &
Horwitz (2005; see Conrad, 2007).
Table 4.1 provides a digestible comprehension of each version of the DSM as it
relates to their total number of diagnoses, the total number of personality disorder
diagnoses, and the total number of pages. While the books may appear intimidating by
their weight and size, a hefty portion of the text relates to properly utilizing the diagnostic
material as well as an elaboration in regards to criteria, symptomology, and prevalence
rates (e.g., sex ratio, age, co-morbidities) for each disorder. However, what is of particular
intrigue is twofold. Firstly, the relationship between the total number of diagnoses and the
total number of pages displays a peculiar result. In the first edition of the DSM (APA,
1952), there are 106 diagnoses within 130 pages of text and by the next edition in 1968, an
additional 76 diagnoses are squeezed into an additional 4 pages of text. Furthermore, as
psychiatry becomes the discipline of choice (over psychoanalysis), the third edition of the
DSM in 1980 contains 265 diagnoses within 494 pages of text. This is important to note
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because, as mentioned earlier, psychiatry incorporates scientific research in order to
elaborate with further “expertise” and confidence that what is legitimately disordered is
exemplified by scientific support. Moreover, after the third edition, the positive
relationship between diagnoses and page numbers has sharply increased in the following
four versions, with particular attention to be focused on page numbers in relation to total
diagnoses.
Secondly, the relationship between the total number of personality disorder
diagnoses and the total number of pages demonstrates a negative relationship over the
span of the seven published versions. In the first edition of the DSM, there are a total of 24
personality disorder diagnoses within the 130 total pages, 8 of which cover personality
disorder diagnoses; by the second edition in 1968, there are 12 personality disorder
diagnoses within 134 total pages with only three pages dedicated to personality disorder
diagnoses. Psychoanalysis, which particularly focuses on disorders of the personality (or
more specifically, the imbalance of the id and superego and its effect on the individual)
enters into the diagnostic world with a thunderous roar and quickly subsides by the second
edition. Moreover, by the third edition and onward (with minor exceptions), the number of
personality disorder diagnoses decline in number but increase in depth; for example, in the
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), there are 11 personality disorder diagnoses and 44 pages
which explain the diagnoses. Moreover, by the fifth edition of the DSM in 2013, there are
13 diagnoses and 39 pages which discuss the diagnoses. Given this minor insight with the
use of comparisons in Table 4.1, it would appear that power is the ability to define as well
as the perimeters and necessity for elaborating upon its truths.
During World War II, Allied forces were fighting against a larger enemy (i.e., Axis
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nations) which viewed Western capitalism and communism as the deterioration of
civilization. The “Big Three” Allied forces (i.e., United States, Britain, and Soviet Russia)
cooperated with one another against a larger enemy which threatened their position of
power, despite their political differences. However, after the end of WWII and the
enforcement of the Marshall Plan, the anonymity between the Western Bloc (more
specifically, American democracy) and Eastern Bloc is amplified during a 30-year
political and militaristic standoff for world leadership. Albeit there was never a combat
utilizing force between the two superpowers, the ominous political competition and
readiness for a full-scale nuclear attack affected every asset of American life. The United
States sought to differentiate itself in every way possible from Soviet Russia, leading the
government and more specifically, the military, to become a quasi-factor in implementing
power for the elite and a reaffirmation of dueling typologies.
Chapter Three explains that there is a relative consistency to the world and reality,
where the non-problematic concept of normality is frequently approached. By looking at
the political economy, an answer to the question of searching for normalcy and
approaching punishment reveals that normalcy is desired because there is nothing
superior. Normalcy separates “us” from “them” by implementing its truths into the core of
the social group – their identity. The DSM is an inventory system that reports what the
United States conceptualizes as reality and how its citizens function within the given
reality. The DSM functions to weed out abnormalities in human behavior while providing
a perception of justice for separatism. More specifically, it would appear that the DSM has
served its purpose of a political master model of duality because it provides maintenance
of political consciousness and coercion. Moreover, it is when Americans begin to embrace
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these aspects as wholly truthful that duality is able to be sustained without a second
thought, which serves to preserve their existence and exemplify the superiority of
technology and capitalism. The government is a product of coercion by which the elite are
coercive because the general population desires that way of life; therefore, implementing
the clause of separatism and superiority is accomplished through such a purpose of duality
and normalcy.
The pre-modern religious dualities relates to dichotomies of healthy/not healthy, or
sacred/not sacred to provide a notion of self-serving ethnocentrism. As technology begins
to envelop every facet of American capitalism and Western medicine, a new affirmation
of duality struggles to define what is healthy and not healthy, so the direction of
dichotomies is geared towards defining what is normal through what it is not with the
assistance of science and technology. Normalcy cannot be defined because it would
constrain the elite and show the irrationality underlying normalcy and the relationship
between the elite and subservient. The solution becomes tinkering and shifting the
perimeters of abnormal behaviors around to make the same concept appear new during
temporal progression, which is strengthened under the guise of a political agenda. In
specific, the DSM successfully separates Americans from the “other” by being a model of
aspirations for other countries, which reaffirms the notion of its citizens being
qualitatively different from other countries. Furthermore, the DSM domestically separates
the subservient class from the elite by reaffirming the power of the elite to maintain a
society by which the subservient class agrees to abide in return for protection and a life of
comfort.
As briefly discussed in the current chapter, power lies within the ability to define
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and inhibit contestation or alternative thinking. Power has transformed a nation born from
revolution into the standardization for other nations, coupled by a set of dogmas enveloped
in myopic ideologies and values. With the assistance of Lipset (1996), American
Exceptionalism highlights how the United States has turned its ideologies and polity into
an ism unlike any other, where allegiance supersedes birthright and power remains
selfishly within the hands of a few (i.e., the elite). As a demonstration of its debilitating
power, the United States utilizes the DSM as a reaffirmation of power and politics to
define what is normal by highlighting what is contextually abnormal. Throughout the
history of the DSM and its seven editions, science has capitalized on supporting these
diagnoses and moreover, encapsulated an entire nation to submission and dependence.
With the help of Conrad (2007), medicalization accentuates the implications of a
widespread medical jurisdiction on both a macro and micro scale of American economics
and the importance for sociological research. No longer are occurrences throughout the
lifespan seen as such, nor are personalities to be unique; advocacy groups, people, and
physicians play a role in the legitimization of disorders and diseases. Furthermore, the top
rung of Hunter’s (2014) hierarchy of social adhesion, Medicalization and Punishment, is
discussed at the beginning of the current chapter and describes the sovereign gaze which
parenthesizes the individual and their attributes. Moreover, the influence of science and
the physician has replaced religion and the church, as they are now the “priests of the
body” (Foucault, 1963, p. 32) and shape the current state of reality.
In the following chapter, a summary of the current thesis will cover what the
purposes of its defense are, as well as future research and its implications for what is now
uncovered. Likewise, the proposed hypotheses from the introduction will be revisited and
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a personal revelation will close the chapter of the book, as well as one chapter in the life of
a scholar.
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Chapter Five
“War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength,” (1984; George
Orwell, 1949, p. 6).
First and foremost, I will open this final chapter by defending my position to write
in first-person. Given the nature of the current defense, it would appear quite hypocritical
to explain my position from an omniscient and encompassing perspective. I do not claim
to be any wiser or knowledgeable than my neighbor, and I humbly give my gratitude to
those who have opened my eyes to a realization beyond science and standardization. As I
have made this journey through the current defense, I have questioned myself and
struggled against the currents of abstract thinking, far beyond what my background in
psychology could provide. Within my defense, I aim to provide another way of thinking
about reality and the function of society, at least from the point of view that seven stillframes impact the perception of the American way of life. In the current chapter, I will
first briefly summarize a few major points of my defense, followed by revisiting the
hypotheses from the first chapter, as well as possibilities for future research and
implications. In closing the chapter, I will discuss a few limitations from the study, as
well as implications for future research
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A major theme of my defense is the influence of elitism as well as the function of
individuals and subservient groups within society. My arguments are made possible by
utilizing the works of Marcuse (1964), Foucault (1963, 1964), the medicalization theory
provided by Conrad (2007), and the theory of American Exceptionalism as briefly
provided by Lipset (1996) to make one point abundantly clear: power lies in the details.
Moreover, my defense is framed around hegemony, yet it is not credited and must
therefore be given its breath now. Antonio Gramsci, a member of the Italian Communist
Party during the first half of the twentieth century, coined the term hegemony to reflect
its sovereignty through many social devices, including churches, schools, trade unions,
and within the household (Kertzer, 1979). Hegemonic control implies that whatever the
view of the nation or the world may be at a given time, it is accepted and becomes “part
of what is thought of as common sense,” (p. 324). Moreover, successful “‘dominant
conception’ … becomes a ‘faith’ which is not consciously articulated,” (p. 324) and it is
what keeps contradictions from collapsing and ultimately overthrowing all that is
controllably accepted as truth as well as securing the position of the coercive party.
Discussion
American politics controls and manipulates nearly every facet of the economy,
from education, employment, technology, militarization, to medicalization and
everything in between. As common sense, or dominant conception, relates to
medicalization and psychiatry, the DSM articulates a notion of common sense that has
never been done before. The DSM is a materialization of discriminatory dichotomies
which functions to articulate how and why an individual is abnormal and it avoids
contradiction by shifting its perimeters around via revisions and updated versions.
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Moreover, the newness of each edition prompts that scientific research and harmonization
provide groundbreaking details, thus securing the value of its truths and the position of
the elite. In congruence with symbolic interactionism, concepts such as ego-syntonic and
maladaptive are useful to describe abnormalities because the problem no longer depends
upon the detection of the individual but how others view that individual within the
perimeters of an idealist reality.
The functional position of the madman throughout history has transitioned from
folly and tales, to apocalyptic nightmares meandering upon an aimless ship, to
institutionalized livestock, to parenthesized subjects residing on the negative scale of a
dangerous dichotomy. Concurrently, the physical position of the madman has gradually
transitioned from the perimeters to the center as the methods for control has gradually
refined a course of containment and observation. Furthermore, the connection to the
DSM and the unconscious observation of other nations lies within this understanding of
the madman’s transitional purpose; by corralling the insane towards the center, power is
easily reinforced and societal shame is hidden. In specific, by containing the insane (and
the subservient class in extension) within the center of society, their presence does not
blemish our impression as the leader on the world stage. It is with this realization in mind
that Foucault’s (1964) concept of “madness of vain presumption” (p. 29; see p. 44) is
applicable to an entire nation. To recant the question that was posed earlier, which asks
“how then, with all respect, is the ‘normal’ population of society any different than the
madman to whom is caged?” (p. 44) the answer is that we are all caged – we are all
parenthesized.
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Two hypotheses were stated in the introduction of my defense, and will now be
revisited to gage their accuracy. The first hypothesis states that the transition from
psychoanalysis to psychiatry in the DSM-III (APA, 1980) will result in an expected
increase in the average amount of personality disorder classifications. Contrary to my
initial assumption, the transition to psychiatry as the dominant discipline in psychology
actually results in an initial decrease in the total number of personality disorder
classifications, as demonstrated in Table 4.1. However, my first hypothesis is not wholly
incorrect; in the DSM-V (APA, 2013), there appears to be an increase in the number of
personality disorder classifications as well as the breadth of information reported. There
are 13 personality disorder classifications in the DSM-V (APA, 2013), which is one more
classification than the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) and one less classification than in the
DSM-III (1980). Likewise, while the total number of personality disorder classifications
has generally expressed a downward trend, the number of pages which cover Axis II
personality disorder classifications has reflected a nearly twofold increase since the third
version of the DSM.
The second hypothesis states that since the introduction of psychiatry as the
dominant discipline of professional psychology, the revisions and refinement of published
personality disorder classifications correlates in a political manner which separates
American behavior from the “other” as well as from one another. Throughout my defense,
I try to include historical context around the DSM publications, particularly during the
height of the Cold War and the Stonewall riots. It is to my understanding that the political
agenda geared for the DSM-III is twofold in contribution – advocacy and adversarial. In
regards to advocacy, the LGBTQ community experienced a civil rights movement after
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the Stonewall riots, including growing demands to eradicate homosexuality from the
DSM.
As the political agenda relates to adversarial is in response to the duality between
two superpowers, namely the Soviet Union and the United States. American ideologies
did not tolerate resistance and sought to qualitatively differentiate itself and its citizens
from communism and the citizens behind the Iron Curtain. In order to provide substantial
justifications for a myopic dichotomy (i.e. “us”/”not us”, “normal/not normal”) to be
common sense, scientific research provided a posteriori justification for abnormal or
deviant behavior. Lastly, the rise in the number of personality disorders in the current
version of the DSM may parallel the number of classifications from the DSM-III (APA,
1980) – political conflict.
Limitations
Comparison limitations. With one minor exception to the trend noted in the relationship
between classification numbers and page numbers which discuss personality disorders, the
DSM-V (2013) serves to be an exception, albeit not significant. The decrease in number of
pages covering Axis II personality disorder classifications and the increase in the number
of personality disorder classifications may reflect a lack of evidence to fully support the
new classifications, despite their perceived legitimacy for inclusion on the classification
roster.
Cross-cultural limitations. A cross-cultural analysis of biomedicine cannot be conducted
since biomedicine concerns Western medicine, including psychology. However, countries
that are integrating biomedicine into their practices (e.g. India and China) may serve as
useful comparisons for later research.
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Conclusion and Future Research
Now that the information has been presented, what should be taken away from my
defense? Upon completion of my defense, I have to admit that while I have not provided
tangible change to the research world, it is my hope that my approach to the current state
of affairs as it relates to the DSM and American Exceptionalism will inspire others to
think outside of the box. The implications of medical jurisdiction are rapidly expanding
and need to be researched from a sociological approach because it affects society on both
a macro and micro scale, especially ethical and moral concerns. Ethically, medicalization
and the DSM give the impression that the United States, its citizens, and their medical
concerns are legitimately, qualitatively different. In specific, individuals seek to find
answers to benign concerns that were previously accepted as changes throughout their
lives. Likewise, the DSM is responsible for reaffirming the belief that American citizens
are qualitatively different from other nations, as well as qualitatively different from one
another.
False needs are emphasized through the media, particularly advertisements and
technology, and this includes medicalization. Morally, medicalization suffocates
American citizens by accentuating relatively mild symptoms to be attributable to bodily
malfunction. Americans are preoccupied with avoiding the aging process, ostracism, and
mental defect that medicalization results in a multi-billion dollar industry and a nation that
is drowning in financial debt. The DSM, and particularly personality disorder
classifications, is a materialized articulation which justifies that abnormalities are
problematic and encourages unconscious separatism from within the nation and abroad.
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Elitists are profiting from the subservient class’ dependence on pharmaceuticals,
incarceration, social desirability, and comfort without contestation.
It should be clarified that the DSM is a valuable tool, but the value may not be in
relation to justifying its practicality in psychiatry (and more broadly, psychology). The
compartmentalized, cultural specificity of the DSM is unique to the United States, but its
value is specific to the political and economic reality of the given moment. Moreover, the
DSM keeps businesses functioning; the DSM acts as an intermediary device for
psychology and therapy, which fuels other businesses (e.g., intervention, pharmaceutical
representatives) and prevents the infrastructure of psychology from collapsing. Advances
in the name of science and technology are accredited for improved expertise of the
individual and their conditions, instead of accepting imminent death. The DSM,
specifically the third through fifth editions, utilizes science and technology to justify the
borders of reality for subservient social groups. In a more broad sense, the DSM functions
as a check and balance for compartmentalization, business excursion, and inadvertently
articulating the parameters of behavior and thought by emphasizing what is socially
unacceptable or abnormal.
Future research should include deeper historical research as it relates to diagnostic
tools and criteria which serve as a basis for current biomedical research. Likewise, more
sociological and anthropological research should investigate American Exceptionalism
from an interdisciplinary perspective in order to understand the impact of science and
technology on nationalist ideologies. Lastly, future research should include cross-cultural
analyses with non-Western medicine as it pertains to mental disorders, behavior, and the
societal function of the abnormal. In conclusion, the madman may still represent
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apocalyptic premonitions and just transitioned to a new position within society, which
contextually adapts based on temporal progression. Yet the question still remains, who is
truly insane?
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